国际贸易和投资的法治?多层次仲裁、裁决与“司法越权”

E. Petersmann
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引用次数: 0

摘要

仲裁和裁决的目的是维护法治,这是乔治·贝尔尼尼教授毕生关注的问题。联合国将“国家和国际层面的法治”定义为“一种治理原则,在这种原则下,所有个人、机构和实体,包括国家本身,都对公开颁布、平等执行和独立裁决的法律负责,并与国际公认的人权相一致”。这种“法治”仅在20世纪90年代随着关贸总协定/世界贸易组织法律和投资者-国家仲裁(ISA)的“司法化”才出现在全球贸易和投资法中。今天,世界贸易组织(WTO)的裁决和ISA都受到了挑战:美国以权力为导向对上诉机构(AB)提名的阻挠使WTO AB功能失调;它将强权政治重新引入世贸组织争端解决机制,并受自愿“临时上诉仲裁”的限制。一些发展中国家和欧盟内部反对ISA,认为它是对民主宪政的威胁。这篇文章讨论了这些辩证的发展,即ISA改革旨在加强欧盟内外的“公法裁决”;世贸组织上诉法院系统被转变为自愿仲裁,以应对所谓的“司法越权”;欧盟内部的多层次司法合作,德国宪法法院自20世纪50年代欧洲经济一体化开始以来首次拒绝遵守欧洲法院(CJEU)的判决,理由是CJEU和欧洲中央银行侵犯国家经济和财政政策权力的“相称性理由”不足,“任意”超越了它们有限的权力。如何在国家法院和国际法院的多层次司法合作中保护法治、宪法和“协商民主”以及司法礼让?
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Rule-of-Law in International Trade and Investments? Between Multilevel Arbitration, Adjudication and ‘Judicial Overreach’
Arbitration and adjudication aim at protecting rule-of-law, which was a life-long concern for Prof. Giorgio Bernini. The United Nations (UN) have defined ‘rule of law at national and international levels’ as ‘a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with internationally recognized human rights’. Such ‘rule of law’ has emerged in worldwide trade and investment law only since the 1990s with the ‘judicialization’ of GATT/WTO law and investor-state arbitration (ISA). Both the World Trade Organization (WTO) adjudication and ISA are today challenged: The power-oriented blockage of Appellate Body (AB) nominations by the USA has rendered the WTO AB dysfunctional; it re-introduced power-politics into the WTO dispute settlement system, limited by voluntary ‘interim appellate arbitration’. ISA is rejected by some developing countries and inside the European Union as a threat to democratic constitutionalism. This contribution discusses these dialectic developments, i.e. ISA reforms aimed at strengthening ‘public law adjudication’ inside and beyond the European Union; the WTO appellate court system being transformed into voluntary arbitration in response to alleged ‘judicial overreach’; and multilevel judicial cooperation inside the EU, where the German Constitutional Court has - for the first time since the beginning of European economic integration in the 1950s - refused complying with a judgment of the European Court of Justice (CJEU) on the ground that the CJEU and the European Central Bank exceeded their limited powers ‘arbitrarily’ due to their insufficient ‘proportionality justification’ of encroachment on national economic and fiscal policy powers. How can rule-of-law, constitutional and ‘deliberative democracy’ and judicial comity be protected in multilevel, judicial cooperation among national and international courts?
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