倡导是一场逐底竞赛:重新思考律师言论自由的限制

Peter S. Margulies
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引用次数: 1

摘要

寻求宪法第一修正案保护的律师们一直在徒劳地寻找一个前后一致的理论。法院也帮不了什么忙。最高法院在“法律服务公司诉贝拉斯克斯案”(Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez)一案中取消了政府对挑战福利改革立法的律师提供援助的限制,这是对宪法第一修正案强有力解释的一个高潮。然而,其他案例则传递了一个复杂的信息。法院限制律师在未决案件中公开讨论证据,而最高法院对加希蒂案的裁决没有为检察官办公室的内部异议提供保护。最近的一项裁决,霍尔德诉人道主义法项目,引发了人们的担忧,即法院准备禁止恐怖组织的法律代理。学者们加剧了这种困惑。一些人从管理的角度出发,批评委拉斯奎兹错误地断言,法院既有惩罚琐碎法律索赔的权力,也应该允许国会选择由政府资助的律师可以挑战的法律。与此相反,绝对论者认为律师和其他个人拥有同样的言论自由权利,但他们将自己的分析与城镇会议和法庭之间的可疑类比联系在一起。管理主义者对言论限制的要求过于严格;绝对主义者对任何限制都嗤之以鼻。为了减轻这种困惑,本文概述了一种新的方法:结构信号。当获得完整信息的成本过高时,比如当律师的意见书取代贷款人对贷款申请的详尽调查时,信号可以建立信任。然而,信号可能会迅速转向反乌托邦,引发逐底竞争,破坏司法公正等公共产品。偏见的审前宣传,媒体成为陪审团,反映了这种毁灭性的竞争,我称之为信号螺旋。政府也可以触发信号螺旋式上升,就像加希蒂法院不让内部辩论受到保护而引发的检方不披露的隐性信号一样。在每个国家,信号螺旋都具有结构性影响,危及法院在民主治理中的作用。为了说明法院如何从尊重言论自由保护的角度做出回应,该报告引用了刑事司法、限制获得法律代理和律师营销等方面的例子。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Advocacy as a Race to the Bottom: Rethinking Limits on Lawyers’ Free Speech
Attorneys looking for protection under the First Amendment have searched in vain for a consistent theory. Courts have not helped. In a high-water mark for robust interpretation of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez struck down limits on government aid to lawyers who challenged welfare reform legislation. However, other cases send a mixed message. Courts limit lawyers’ public discussion of evidence in pending cases, while the Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti provided no protection for internal dissent in prosecutors’ offices. A recent decision, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, has prompted fears that the Court is poised to bar legal representation of terrorist groups. Scholars have compounded the confusion. Some advance a managerial perspective, criticizing Velazquez by wrongly asserting that a court’s established power to punish frivolous legal claims should also allow Congress to choose the laws that government-funded attorneys can challenge. In contrast, absolutists contend that lawyers and other individuals have identical free speech rights, but tie their analysis to a dubious analogy between the town meeting and the courtroom. Managerialists demand too much deference to restrictions on speech; absolutists bridle at any limits at all. To ease the confusion, the paper outlines a new approach: structural signaling. Signaling can build trust when obtaining complete information is too costly, as when a lawyer’s opinion letter replaces a lender’s exhaustive investigation of a loan application. However, signaling can rapidly turn dystopian, triggering races to the bottom that destroy public goods such as the integrity of adjudication. Prejudicial pretrial publicity, in which the media becomes the jury, reflects this sort of ruinous competition, which I call a signaling spiral. The government can also trigger signaling spirals, as in the tacit signaling of prosecutorial nondisclosure that the Garcetti Court spurred by leaving internal debate unprotected. In each, signaling spirals have structural effects, imperiling courts’ role in democratic governance. To show how courts can respond with pivots from deference to free-speech protection, the paper cites examples from criminal justice, restrictions on access to legal representation, and lawyers’ marketing.
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