董事会和盈余管理:传统银行和伊斯兰银行

IF 1.4 4区经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2021-03-02 DOI:10.1080/16081625.2021.1886951

Ahmad Abu-Dawleh, N. Lybaert, Tensie Steijvers, Mieke Jans

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引用次数: 4

摘要

摘要本研究探讨了伊斯兰银行董事会(BOD)与传统银行董事会(cb)相比，对盈余管理的影响有何不同。我们的研究结果表明，在中东和北非地区，促进董事会独立性的银行产生较少的盈余管理。区分cb和ib，我们在ib中记录了更高的贷款质量和信贷政策。此外，较小的董事会规模和董事会独立性降低了ib的盈余管理。研究结果表明，代理理论可能无法适应企业内部的代理冲突，因为它忽略了利益相关者的行为模式。因此，这些结果表明，有必要培养商学院董事的财务敏锐度。

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Board of directors and earnings management: conventional and Islamic banks

ABSTRACT This study examines how the board of directors (BOD) of Islamic banks (IBs) might affect earnings management differently, compared to BOD of conventional banks (CBs). Our results indicate that banks in the MENA region that promote BOD independence incur less earnings management. Distinguishing between CBs and IBs, we document higher loan quality and credit policy at IBs. Moreover, smaller BOD size and board independence decrease earnings management at IBs. Findings suggest that agency theory might not accommodate the agency conflicts at IBs, since it neglects stakeholders’ behavioural patterns. Thus, these results suggest the need to shape directors’ financial acumen at IBs.

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来源期刊

Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

2.40

自引率

9.10%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics (APJAE) is an international forum intended for theoretical and empirical research in all areas of economics and accounting in general. In particular, the journal encourages submissions in the following areas: Auditing, financial reporting, earnings management, financial analysts, the role of accounting information, international trade and finance, industrial organization, strategic behavior, market structure, financial contracts, corporate governance, capital markets, and financial institutions. The journal welcomes contributions related to the Asia Pacific region, and targets top quality research from scholars with diverse regional interests. The editors encourage submission of high quality manuscripts with innovative ideas. The editorial team is committed to an expedient review process.