关系采购的供应网络

IF 0.1 4区 工程技术 Q4 ENGINEERING, MANUFACTURING
E. Belavina
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引用次数: 12

摘要

在质量包括社会、道德和技术因素的行业中,对独家供应商或关系采购做出长期承诺是至关重要的,这些因素涉及合同条款的验证或执行成本很高。本研究确定了最有利于这种关系采购的供应商网络拓扑结构。我们考虑的是一家拥有品牌的公司,它以一种持续的方式从一个由特殊供应商组成的一般多层网络中采购。在三个定义结构属性方面比较了不同的网络设计:网络范围,网络中每层供应商的数量;控制/委托程度,网络中的层数;网络连接,位于不同层次的公司之间的连接。我们的分析表明,网络连通性和供应商之间的成本分配都不会影响维持关系采购的能力。以更多委托或更小范围为特征的网络从关系采购中获益最多,但它们也最容易受到关系协议的利用。我们描述了这种权衡并确定了首选的网络拓扑结构。我们的分析表明,在其他条件相同的情况下,对于利润更高、采购更稳定或不合规质量成本更低的产品,授权比控制要好。数值分析表明,低范围网络也更适合高利润产品,采购稳定性更强;然而,低范围网络是首选,因为不符合质量的成本更高。这些结果对替代信息环境、供应商可替代性和均衡概念具有鲁棒性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Supply Networks for Relational Sourcing
Making long-term commitments to exclusive suppliers, or relational sourcing, is critical in industries where quality includes social, ethical, and technical elements concerning which contractual terms would be costly to verify or enforce. This study identifies supplier network topologies that best facilitate such relational sourcing. We consider a brand-owning firm that sources in an ongoing fashion from a general multi-tier network of idiosyncratic suppliers. Alternate network designs are compared in terms of three defining structural properties: network scope, the number of suppliers at each tier in the network; degree of control/delegation, the number of tiers in the network; and network connectivity, the connections between firms located at different tiers. Our analysis reveals that neither network connectivity nor the distribution of costs among suppliers affects the ability to sustain relational sourcing. Networks characterized by more delegation or less scope have the most to gain from relational sourcing, but they are also most vulnerable to exploitation of a relational agreement. We characterize this trade-off and identify preferred network topologies. Our analysis shows that, all else equal, delegation is better than control for products with higher margins, greater sourcing stability, or lower costs of noncompliant quality. Numerical analysis reveals that low-scope networks, too, are preferable for higher-margin products with greater sourcing stability; however, low-scope networks are preferred at higher costs of noncompliant quality. These results are robust to alternate information environments, supplier replaceability and equilibrium concepts.
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来源期刊
Manufacturing Engineering
Manufacturing Engineering 工程技术-工程:制造
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审稿时长
6-12 weeks
期刊介绍: Information not localized
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