偶尔的自由意志主义:自我服务遗漏偏见的实验证据

IF 1.3 3区 社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Andrew T. Hayashi
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引用次数: 12

摘要

人们评估结果的部分依据是这些结果是如何产生的以及是谁造成的。例如,对适当的再分配税收的态度反映了人们对运气和人类能动性在创造税前收入分配中所起的因果作用的看法。然而,因果归因是一个既复杂又容易受到偏见影响的过程。我从一个独裁者游戏的变体中生成了个人层面的数据,在这个游戏中,参与者的初始禀赋被操纵,以确定人们如何关心因果归因的一个方面。这些数据与仅根据结果定义的偏好模型不一致,也与不作为的普遍偏见不一致。受试者独立但有条件地关心自己行为的影响,只有在符合自身利益的情况下才倾向于不作为。(JEL A12, A13, C91, D63)牛津大学出版社代表耶鲁大学出版。版权所有。有关许可,请发送电子邮件:journals.permissions@oup.com,牛津大学出版社。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Occasionally Libertarian: Experimental Evidence of Self-Serving Omission Bias
People evaluate outcomes, in part, by how those outcomes came about and who caused them. For example, attitudes about the proper amount of redistributive taxation reflect beliefs about the causal roles played by luck and human agency in creating the pre-tax income distribution. Causal attribution, however, is a process both complicated and subject to bias. I generate individual-level data from a variation on the dictator game in which the participants' initial endowments are manipulated to identify one aspect of how people care about causal attribution. The data are inconsistent with models of preferences defined solely over outcomes and also with a general bias toward inaction. Subjects care independently, but conditionally, about the effects of their own actions and demonstrate a bias toward inaction only when it is in their self-interest. (JEL A12, A13, C91, D63) The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com, Oxford University Press.
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CiteScore
2.20
自引率
0.00%
发文量
25
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