{"title":"CEO风险承担激励对客户和供应商关系特定投资的影响","authors":"Jayant R. Kale, Simi Kedia, Ryan Williams","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1787113","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"A firm’s customers and suppliers make relationship-specific investments (RSI) whose value reduces if the firm undertakes risky investments. We hypothesize that the risk-taking incentives in the firm CEO’s compensation will lower the RSI by firms up and down in the vertical channel. We provide significant evidence that customer/supplier RSI declines with the risk-taking incentives of the firm’s CEO. Moreover, we find that RSI is more sensitive to the CEO’s risk-taking incentives when they are more likely to increase the firm’s cash flow volatility. Our findings are robust to correcting for endogeneity and several measures for RSI and risk taking.","PeriodicalId":11485,"journal":{"name":"Econometrics: Applied Econometrics & Modeling eJournal","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"14","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Effect of CEO’s Risk-Taking Incentives on Relationship-Specific Investments by Customers and Suppliers\",\"authors\":\"Jayant R. Kale, Simi Kedia, Ryan Williams\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.1787113\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"A firm’s customers and suppliers make relationship-specific investments (RSI) whose value reduces if the firm undertakes risky investments. We hypothesize that the risk-taking incentives in the firm CEO’s compensation will lower the RSI by firms up and down in the vertical channel. We provide significant evidence that customer/supplier RSI declines with the risk-taking incentives of the firm’s CEO. Moreover, we find that RSI is more sensitive to the CEO’s risk-taking incentives when they are more likely to increase the firm’s cash flow volatility. Our findings are robust to correcting for endogeneity and several measures for RSI and risk taking.\",\"PeriodicalId\":11485,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Econometrics: Applied Econometrics & Modeling eJournal\",\"volume\":\"17 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2015-10-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"14\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Econometrics: Applied Econometrics & Modeling eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1787113\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Econometrics: Applied Econometrics & Modeling eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1787113","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Effect of CEO’s Risk-Taking Incentives on Relationship-Specific Investments by Customers and Suppliers
A firm’s customers and suppliers make relationship-specific investments (RSI) whose value reduces if the firm undertakes risky investments. We hypothesize that the risk-taking incentives in the firm CEO’s compensation will lower the RSI by firms up and down in the vertical channel. We provide significant evidence that customer/supplier RSI declines with the risk-taking incentives of the firm’s CEO. Moreover, we find that RSI is more sensitive to the CEO’s risk-taking incentives when they are more likely to increase the firm’s cash flow volatility. Our findings are robust to correcting for endogeneity and several measures for RSI and risk taking.
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