世界反兴奋剂机构是时候坚持到底了:在美国体育联盟中维持集体协商的反兴奋剂政策

Warren Chu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

如果你问任何一个经常观看体育比赛的人,兴奋剂或提高成绩的药物(“ped”)是否在美国任何一个主要的体育联盟中普遍存在,答案很可能是响亮的“是的”。从巴里·邦兹(Barry Bonds)到兰斯·阿姆斯特朗(Lance Armstrong),兴奋剂的幽灵在过去几十年里一直笼罩着美国体育界,加大力度抓捕违规者的压力也一直存在。然而,虽然美国主要的体育联盟(如美国职业棒球大联盟、美国国家篮球协会和美国国家橄榄球联盟)已经更新了他们的药物政策,但他们还没有签署世界反兴奋剂机构的反兴奋剂条例。对于外界观察人士来说,问题来了:如果美国体育联盟真的想要抓住使用兴奋剂的运动员,那么他们为什么不与世界上最大的反兴奋剂机构签约呢?世界反兴奋剂机构(WADA)是为了解决1998年环法自行车赛上发生的兴奋剂丑闻,由国际奥委会于1999年成立的。该机构的《守则》旨在极其严格和惩罚性,以适当地阻止运动员使用兴奋剂并影响比赛的公平性。他们严格的规则引起了许多运动员的愤怒,并涉及隐私问题,但仍然存在,管理着奥运会,国际体育比赛,甚至是美国反兴奋剂机构的终极格斗比赛。MLB、NBA和NFL不顾国会和世界反兴奋剂机构官员过去的压力,继续监督自己的运动员,并与球员工会集体谈判,制定既有效又少侵犯性的药物检测政策。集体谈判一直被《世界反兴奋剂机构条例》的支持者视为一个弱点;他们的论点是,集体谈判未能解决球员谈判“无牙”药物政策的动机,以及联盟确保其明星球员不卷入任何丑闻的动机。然而,这些担忧通常被夸大了,这将在下面进一步解释。本文认为,虽然美国体育联盟在适当打击兴奋剂方面确实有一些工作要做,但世界反兴奋剂机构的《条例》过于严厉,过于严厉,无法在美国体育运动中实施。就目前而言,美国体育联盟的政策已经足够了,不应该变得比现在更严厉。第一部分考察了美国职业棒球大联盟、NBA和NFL目前的反兴奋剂政策以及世界反兴奋剂机构准则。第二部分认为,由于WADA规则的缺陷,美国主要体育联盟采用WADA的规则来管理自己是不明智的,因为两者在有效性上的差异并不大到足以对美国运动员施加WADA限制,而且兴奋剂也没有大到足以证明其合理性的问题。第三部分建议,通过建立一个独立的机构,与每个体育项目的球员工会保持联系,在当前的美国体育联盟政策和WADA准则之间取得平衡,将有助于解决MLB、NBA和NFL所征收的一些问题,同时避免WADA准则过于惩罚性和侵入性的方面。本说明还将断言,在反兴奋剂斗争中争取赞助商可能会比现行制度更有效。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
WADA Time to Stay the Course: Maintaining the Collectively Bargained Anti-Doping Policies in American Sports Leagues
If you were to ask any person that regularly watches sports if doping or performance enhancing drugs (“PEDs”) are prevalent in any of the major American sports leagues, the answer would likely be a resounding “yes.” From Barry Bonds to Lance Armstrong, the specter of doping has hung over American sports through the past few decades and there has been a consistent pressure to ramp up efforts to catch offenders. Yet, while the major American sports leagues (such as Major League Baseball, the National Basketball Association, and the National Football League) have updated their drug policies, they have not signed onto the World Anti-Doping Agency’s Anti-Doping Code. To outside observers, the question arises: if American sports leagues are truly serious about catching athletes who use performance enhancing drugs, then why would they not sign onto the world’s largest anti-doping agency?

The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) was established in 1999 by the International Olympic Committee in order to address the doping scandal that occurred at the 1998 Tour de France. The Agency’s Code is designed to be extremely strict and punitive in order to properly deter athletes from doping and affecting the fairness of competitions. Their strict code has drawn the ire of many athletes and implicated privacy concerns, but remains in place, governing the Olympics, international sporting competitions, and even the Ultimate Fighting Competition through the US Anti-Doping Agency.

The MLB, NBA, and NFL, despite past pressure from Congress and WADA officials, have continued to monitor their own athletes and collectively bargain with their players’ unions to develop drug testing policies that are both effective and less invasive. Collective bargaining has been seen as a weakness among proponents of the WADA Code; the argument is that collective bargaining fails to address the incentives for players to negotiate “toothless” drug policies and incentives for leagues to ensure that their star players are not implicated in any scandals. However, these concerns are generally overblown, which will be explained further below.

This Note argues that while American sports leagues do have some work to do in order to properly combat doping, the WADA Code is far too draconian and overly punitive to be implemented in American sports. As they stand, the American sports league policies are sufficient and should not become any harsher than they currently are. Part I examines the current anti-doping policies of the MLB, NBA, and NFL as well as the WADA Code. Part II argues that because of the drawbacks of the WADA Code, the American major sports leagues would be ill-advised to adopt WADA’s Code to govern themselves both because the difference in effectiveness is not significant enough to impose the WADA restrictions on American athletes and because doping is not significant enough of a problem to justify it. Part III suggests that striking a balance between current American sports league policies and the WADA code through the establishment of an independent agency that liaisons with each sports’ players’ union, would serve to both address some of the issues levied at the MLB, NBA, and NFL while avoiding the overly punitive and invasive aspects of the WADA Code. This Note will also assert that enlisting sponsors in the fight against doping would potentially prove to be more effective than the current regime.
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