系统性风险资本附加费的市场影响

Yalin Gündüz
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引用次数: 2

摘要

本文测试了监管机构设想的全球系统重要性银行(G-SIB)资本附加费的增加或减少是否会对这些银行的CDS价格产生影响。我们发现证据表明,在宣布更高(更低)的资本附加费后,G-SIB银行的CDS价差增加(减少)。然而,这种影响是暂时的,因为平均CDS价差在最初上升后急剧下降,恢复到公告发布前的水平。我们的分析有助于讨论被指定为G-SIB银行是否必然导致隐性的“大到不能倒”补贴。研究结果表明,投资者在资金桶再分配公告后立即更新了对银行系统性风险的看法,并暂时要求增加对系统性风险的对冲。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Market Impact of Systemic Risk Capital Surcharges
This paper tests whether an increase or decrease of the capital surcharge for being a global systemically important bank (G-SIB) envisaged by regulators has an impact on the CDS prices of these banks. We find evidence that the CDS spreads of a G-SIB bank increase (decrease) after the announcement of a higher (lower) capital surcharge. However, this effect is temporary, as the mean CDS spreads revert to pre-announcement level, dropping sharply after the initial rise. Our analysis contributes to the debate on whether being designated as a G-SIB bank necessarily leads to implicit "too-big-to-fail" subsidies. The findings imply that the investors immediately update their beliefs on the systemic risk of the bank after the bucket reallocation announcement and temporarily demand more hedging against systemic risk.
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