是时候重新审视偿付能力融资规则了

N. Nielson
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引用次数: 0

摘要

加拿大人不喜欢听到人们因为雇主滥用钱而失去辛苦挣来的养老金的消息。一想到有些上班族在为一家公司工作了一辈子,却被剥夺了养老金,自然会感到反感。这就是为什么围绕固定收益养老金计划的法规旨在迫使雇主保持其养老金有足够的偿付能力。但实现这一目标的方法有很多,尽管加拿大公司必须遵守的规定可能有助于保存养老金储蓄,但与其他能起到同样作用的政策相比,这些规定对雇主和监管机构来说也非常昂贵。事实上,规则的灵活性甚至可能使公司更容易向员工提供比现在更丰厚的养老金福利。加拿大一些过时的养老基金规定产生了相反的问题:如果你假设公司和养老金计划会继续下去,那么现在的养老金计划实际上是资金过剩的。这意味着,赞助公司本可以用来雇佣更多工人、为员工提供更好的薪酬和福利,或用于投资的资金,都被扣在了养老金金库里。问题在于,“持续经营”估值——假设该计划无限期持续下去——与更具指令性的“偿付能力”估值之间存在分歧,后者是加拿大监管的核心。如果假设雇主即将破产(即使绝大多数大型雇主在任何给定时间都没有破产的风险),它会检查资金是否充足。在固定收益回报丰厚的日子里,公司依靠养老基金投资来充实基金,将保荐人的贡献减少到不安全的水平。偿付能力规则要求在股市中获得较高回报的计划继续为其计划做出一些贡献。当时,持续经营估值与偿付能力估值之间的差距很小,因此这些规则并非不可接受的负担。那些丰厚的回报消失了。现在,估值之间的差距急剧扩大。例如,在不列颠哥伦比亚省,最近的一项分析发现,在使用持续经营评估时,2015年在该省注册的143个固定收益计划中,有75%的计划至少有100%的资金,而资金比率中位数为124%。使用偿付能力模型,资金比率中位数估计为85%,要想弥补这一差距,需要缴纳高额的养老金。更重要的是,它引发的缴款可能永远不需要支付福利。魁北克省是第一个认识到养老基金规则需要重新审视并做出更积极回应的省份,新规则的出台将减轻雇主不必要的负担,同时也适应经济环境的变化。有迹象表明,安大略省将朝着同样的方向采取措施。各地的监管机构都应该重新审视养老金规则:取消对资金充足计划的偿付能力估值要求,同时允许监管机构在他们认为有保证的罕见情况下假设最坏的情况;制定计划信用风险评级方法;对计划负债不那么严格,更现实(允许某些类型的负债使用较长的摊销期);但仍然限制资金不足计划的计划变更。这样一来,不仅可以减少过度监管资金充足、运行良好的计划的成本和工作量,还可以释放现金。通过减少保荐人的现金流压力,增加更多的灵活性,政策制定者最终将使固定收益养老金计划更具可持续性。他们甚至可能看到固定收益计划在雇主中卷土重来,这些雇主发现缴纳高额养老金足以将他们赶出固定收益计划的世界。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Time Has Come to Revisit Solvency Funding Rules
Canadians are not fond of hearing news about people losing their hard-earned pensions because their employer misused the money. The thought of some Working Joe or Jane being deprived of a pension, after a lifetime of working for a company, is naturally repugnant. That is why regulations around defined-benefit pension plans are designed to force employers to keep their pension funds sufficiently solvent. But there are many ways to achieve that end and, while the rules that Canadian companies must follow might serve to help preserve pension savings, they also be very expensive — to employers and regulators — compared to other policies that can do the same thing. In fact, more flexibility in the rules might even make it easier for companies to offer richer pension benefits to employees than they already do. Some of Canada’s outdated pension-funding rules have created the opposite problem: There are now pension plans that are actually overfunded if one assumes the company and the plan will continue. That means money the sponsoring companies could be using to hire more workers, to offer employees better pay and benefits, or to invest, is tied up in pension coffers. The problem lies in the divergence between a “going-concern” valuation — which assumes that the plan continues indefinitely — with the more prescriptive “solvency” valuation that is central to Canadian regulations. It examines funding adequaciy if one assumes the employer is going to go out of business (even if the vast majority of large employers are at any given time at no risk of that). In the days when fixed-income returns were lucrative, companies relied on pension fund investments to top up the funds, reducing sponsor contributions to unsafe levels. The solvency rules required plans that were reaping higher returns in the stock market to continue making some contributions to their plans. Back then, the gap between a going-concern valuation and a solvency valuation was small, and so the rules were not an unacceptable burden. Those rich returns are gone. Now, that gap between valuations has grown dramatically. In B.C., for example, a recent analysis found that when using a going-concern evaluation, 75 per cent of 143 defined-benefit plans registered in the province in 2015 had at least 100-per-cent funding, while the median funding ratio was 124 per cent. Using a solvency model, the median funding ratio was instead estimated to be a much lower 85 per cent. Closing that gap would require onerous pension contributions. More importantly, the contributions it triggers might never be needed to cover benefits. Quebec is the first province to recognize that pension-funding rules need to be revisited and made more responsive, with new rules coming in that will reduce the unnecessary burden on employers while also adapting to changes in the economic environment. Ontario is showing signs that it will take steps in the same direction. Regulators everywhere should be revisiting pension rules to: remove the solvency-valuation requirement for well-funded plans, while allowing the regulator to assume a worst-case scenario in the uncommon case where they believe it to be warranted; to develop a method to rate the credit risk of a plan; to be less stringent and more realistic about plan liabilities (by allowing some types of liabilities to use a longer amortization period); but still restricting plan changes for underfunded plans. The result would not only reduce the cost and work of over-regulating well-funded, well-run plans, while freeing up cash . By reducing pressure on the cash flow for sponsors, and adding more flexibility, the policymakers will ultimately make defined-benefit pension plans more sustainable. They might even see defined-benefit plans making a comeback among employers who found heavy contributions enough to drive them out of the DB world.
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