重述如何开始?重述财务报告前盈余管理的证据

Michael L. Ettredge, Susan Scholz, Kevin R. Smith, Lili Sun
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引用次数: 152

摘要

大多数收益重述被归咎于错误或对公认会计准则的误解,但怀疑仍然存在,许多这些重述是由于有意的盈余管理。我们分析了资产负债表膨胀,或异常高水平的营运资本账户余额,以寻找持续的、增加收入的盈余管理的证据,这些盈余管理“先于”初始的非公认会计准则财务报告。我们建立了一种系统地增加资产负债表膨胀的模式,这些公司后来发布了明显虚假的财务报告。接下来,我们比较了明显非欺诈重述与欺诈和控制样本的膨胀。我们发现,在最初的错报财务报告之前两年,非欺诈重述公司的膨胀高于控制公司。但是,这些公司积累的资产负债表膨胀比那些明显涉及欺诈的公司要小。这表明,即使是明显非欺诈性的重述,其背后也存在有意义但并非普遍的盈余管理。我们将分析扩展到可自由支配的应计项目和实际活动盈余管理。版权所有(c) 2010布莱克威尔出版有限公司
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
How Do Restatements Begin? Evidence of Earnings Management Preceding Restated Financial Reports
Most earnings restatements are blamed on error, or misunderstanding of GAAP, but suspicion persists that many of these restatements are instead due to intentional earnings management. We analyze balance sheet bloat, or unusually high levels of working capital account balances, for evidence of sustained, income-increasing earnings management "prior" to initial non-GAAP financial reports. We establish a pattern of systematically increasing balance sheet bloat for firms later issuing clearly fraudulent financial reports. Next, we compare bloat for apparently non-fraud restatements to fraud and control samples. We find non-fraud restatement companies' bloat is higher than control companies for two years preceding the initial misstated financial report. But, these firms accumulate less balance sheet bloat than companies with restatements clearly involving fraud. This suggests meaningful, but not pervasive, earnings management underlying even apparently non-fraudulent restatements. We extend our analysis to discretionary accruals and real activity earnings management. Copyright (c) 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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