{"title":"分散供应链形成的贝叶斯激励相容机制","authors":"Y. Narahari, N. K. Srivastava","doi":"10.1109/CEC-EEE.2007.109","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we consider a decentralized supply chain formation problem for linear, multi-echelon supply chains when the managers of the individual echelons are autonomous, rational, and intelligent. At each echelon, there is a choice of service providers and the specific problem we solve is that of determining a cost-optimal mix of service providers so as to achieve a desired level of end-to-end delivery performance. The problem can be broken up into two sub-problems following a mechanism design approach: (1) Design of an incentive compatible mechanism to elicit the true cost functions from the echelon managers; (2) Formulation and solution of an appropriate optimization problem using the true cost information. In this paper, we propose a novel Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism for eliciting the true cost functions. This improves upon existing solutions in the literature which are all based on the classical Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms, requiring significant incentives to be paid to the echelon managers for achieving dominant strategy incentive compatibility. The proposed solution, which we call SCF-BIC (supply chain formation with Bayesian incentive compatibility), significantly reduces the cost of supply chain formation. We illustrate the efficacy of the proposed methodology using the example of a three echelon manufacturing supply chain.","PeriodicalId":58336,"journal":{"name":"电子商务评论","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2007-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"10","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanism for Decentralized Supply Chain Formation\",\"authors\":\"Y. Narahari, N. K. Srivastava\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/CEC-EEE.2007.109\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In this paper, we consider a decentralized supply chain formation problem for linear, multi-echelon supply chains when the managers of the individual echelons are autonomous, rational, and intelligent. At each echelon, there is a choice of service providers and the specific problem we solve is that of determining a cost-optimal mix of service providers so as to achieve a desired level of end-to-end delivery performance. The problem can be broken up into two sub-problems following a mechanism design approach: (1) Design of an incentive compatible mechanism to elicit the true cost functions from the echelon managers; (2) Formulation and solution of an appropriate optimization problem using the true cost information. In this paper, we propose a novel Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism for eliciting the true cost functions. This improves upon existing solutions in the literature which are all based on the classical Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms, requiring significant incentives to be paid to the echelon managers for achieving dominant strategy incentive compatibility. The proposed solution, which we call SCF-BIC (supply chain formation with Bayesian incentive compatibility), significantly reduces the cost of supply chain formation. We illustrate the efficacy of the proposed methodology using the example of a three echelon manufacturing supply chain.\",\"PeriodicalId\":58336,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"电子商务评论\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2007-07-23\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"10\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"电子商务评论\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/CEC-EEE.2007.109\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"电子商务评论","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CEC-EEE.2007.109","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
A Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanism for Decentralized Supply Chain Formation
In this paper, we consider a decentralized supply chain formation problem for linear, multi-echelon supply chains when the managers of the individual echelons are autonomous, rational, and intelligent. At each echelon, there is a choice of service providers and the specific problem we solve is that of determining a cost-optimal mix of service providers so as to achieve a desired level of end-to-end delivery performance. The problem can be broken up into two sub-problems following a mechanism design approach: (1) Design of an incentive compatible mechanism to elicit the true cost functions from the echelon managers; (2) Formulation and solution of an appropriate optimization problem using the true cost information. In this paper, we propose a novel Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism for eliciting the true cost functions. This improves upon existing solutions in the literature which are all based on the classical Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms, requiring significant incentives to be paid to the echelon managers for achieving dominant strategy incentive compatibility. The proposed solution, which we call SCF-BIC (supply chain formation with Bayesian incentive compatibility), significantly reduces the cost of supply chain formation. We illustrate the efficacy of the proposed methodology using the example of a three echelon manufacturing supply chain.