{"title":"关于最优分配机制的注解","authors":"N. Figueroa, Vasiliki Skreta","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1120961","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"When the buyer's utility is non-linear in type, revenue-maximizing mechanisms for multiple goods may be random. This happens when the allocation rule obtained via pointwise optimization is not incentive compatible, which is possible even with strictly increasing virtual utilities.","PeriodicalId":10793,"journal":{"name":"Criminal Justice","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2008-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"6","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A Note on Optimal Allocation Mechanisms\",\"authors\":\"N. Figueroa, Vasiliki Skreta\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.1120961\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"When the buyer's utility is non-linear in type, revenue-maximizing mechanisms for multiple goods may be random. This happens when the allocation rule obtained via pointwise optimization is not incentive compatible, which is possible even with strictly increasing virtual utilities.\",\"PeriodicalId\":10793,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Criminal Justice\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2008-04-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"6\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Criminal Justice\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1120961\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Criminal Justice","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1120961","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
When the buyer's utility is non-linear in type, revenue-maximizing mechanisms for multiple goods may be random. This happens when the allocation rule obtained via pointwise optimization is not incentive compatible, which is possible even with strictly increasing virtual utilities.
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