劳动力市场,理性和残疾工人

M. Stein
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引用次数: 21

摘要

对《美国残疾人法》后就业影响的实证研究揭示了一个令人困惑的现象。尽管分析表明,雇用残疾工人可能具有成本效益,尽管经济迅速发展,大多数类别工人的失业率大幅下降,但工作年龄的残疾个人的失业率似乎没有同样减少。从学者将新古典劳动力市场范式应用于第一章的观点来看,对这一现象最清晰的解释似乎是,报告雇用残疾人的成本效益的研究是不正确的(即使只是夸大其词)。从这一解释中得出的结论是,选择残疾工人而不是非残疾工人是一种低效的做法。在接下来的文章中,我将考察和评估以下观点的支持者所提出的论点:雇佣残疾工人的低效率阻碍了他们进入劳动力市场。如果这些论点是合理的,那么理性的市场力量似乎正在无情地削弱《美国残疾人法》第一章所体现的战略。然而,与此相反,我将指出一种市场失灵,它通过制造一种“歧视的味道”来阻止某些雇主做出理性的劳动力市场决策,在这种情况下,将残疾人纳入劳动力的成本被认为比实际情况更大。此外,我将提出一种改进的方法来评估雇用残疾工人的效率,并考虑这种方法对第一章战略的合理性意味着什么。最后,我将表明,现有的新古典经济模型的失败,以及依赖于它的第一章的批评,至少在一定程度上可归因于社会对模型假设中建立的残疾人的误解。也就是说,这些批评远非中立或客观,而是认可并延续了《美国残疾人法》旨在纠正的非理性偏见。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Labor Markets, Rationality, and Workers with Disabilities
Empirical studies of post-ADA employment effects foreground a phenomenon that is puzzling. Although analyses suggest that employing workers with disabilities can be cost effective, and despite a burgeoning economy in which the unemployment rate for most categories of workers has plummeted, unemployment of working age individuals with disabilities appears not to have similarly diminished. From the point of view defined by scholars applying the neoclassical labor market paradigm to Title I, the clearest explanation of this phenomenon would seem to be that the studies reporting the cost effectiveness of employing the disabled are incorrect (even if only overstated). Following from this explication is the conclusion that selecting workers with disabilities over nondisabled workers is an inefficient practice. In what follows, I examine and assess the arguments made by proponents of the view that the inefficiency of employing workers with disabilities is a deterrent to their inclusion in the labor market. If these arguments are sound, then rational market forces appear to be inexorably at work to attenuate the strategy embodied by Title I of the ADA. To the contrary, however, I will identify a market failure that prevents certain employers from reaching rational labor market decisions by creating a "taste for discrimination" in which the costs of including people with disabilities in a workforce are perceived as being greater than they really are. Further, I will propose an improved manner for assessing the efficiency of employing workers with disabilities and consider what this method implies regarding the rationality of Title I's strategy. Finally, I will show that the failure of the existing neoclassical economic model, as well as the Title I critiques that rely on it, is attributable at least in part to societal misconceptions about people with disabilities being built into the model's assumptions. That is, far from being neutral or objective, these critiques sanction and perpetuate the very irrational biases the ADA was designed to correct.
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