SICE:用于x86多核平台的硬件级强隔离计算环境

Ahmed M. Azab, P. Ning, Xiaolan Zhang
{"title":"SICE:用于x86多核平台的硬件级强隔离计算环境","authors":"Ahmed M. Azab, P. Ning, Xiaolan Zhang","doi":"10.1145/2046707.2046752","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"SICE is a novel framework to provide hardware-level isolation and protection for sensitive workloads running on x86 platforms in compute clouds. Unlike existing isolation techniques, SICE does not rely on any software component in the host environment (i.e., an OS or a hypervisor). Instead, the security of the isolated environments is guaranteed by a trusted computing base that only includes the hardware, the BIOS, and the System Management Mode (SMM). SICE provides fast context switching to and from an isolated environment, allowing isolated workloads to time-share the physical platform with untrusted workloads. Moreover, SICE supports a large range (up to 4GB) of isolated memory. Finally, the most unique feature of SICE is the use of multicore processors to allow the isolated environments to run concurrently and yet securely beside the untrusted host. We have implemented a SICE prototype using an AMD x86 hardware platform. Our experiments show that SICE performs fast context switching (67 microseconds) to and from the isolated environment and that it imposes a reasonable overhead (3% on all but one benchmark) on the operation of an isolated Linux virtual machine. Our prototype demonstrates that, subject to a careful security review of the BIOS software and the SMM hardware implementation, current hardware architecture already provides abstractions that can support building strong isolation mechanisms using a very small SMM software foundation of about 300 lines of code.","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"185 1","pages":"375-388"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"137","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"SICE: a hardware-level strongly isolated computing environment for x86 multi-core platforms\",\"authors\":\"Ahmed M. Azab, P. Ning, Xiaolan Zhang\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/2046707.2046752\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"SICE is a novel framework to provide hardware-level isolation and protection for sensitive workloads running on x86 platforms in compute clouds. Unlike existing isolation techniques, SICE does not rely on any software component in the host environment (i.e., an OS or a hypervisor). Instead, the security of the isolated environments is guaranteed by a trusted computing base that only includes the hardware, the BIOS, and the System Management Mode (SMM). SICE provides fast context switching to and from an isolated environment, allowing isolated workloads to time-share the physical platform with untrusted workloads. Moreover, SICE supports a large range (up to 4GB) of isolated memory. Finally, the most unique feature of SICE is the use of multicore processors to allow the isolated environments to run concurrently and yet securely beside the untrusted host. We have implemented a SICE prototype using an AMD x86 hardware platform. Our experiments show that SICE performs fast context switching (67 microseconds) to and from the isolated environment and that it imposes a reasonable overhead (3% on all but one benchmark) on the operation of an isolated Linux virtual machine. Our prototype demonstrates that, subject to a careful security review of the BIOS software and the SMM hardware implementation, current hardware architecture already provides abstractions that can support building strong isolation mechanisms using a very small SMM software foundation of about 300 lines of code.\",\"PeriodicalId\":72687,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security\",\"volume\":\"185 1\",\"pages\":\"375-388\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2011-10-17\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"137\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2046752\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2046752","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 137

摘要

SICE是一个新颖的框架,用于为运行在计算云中的x86平台上的敏感工作负载提供硬件级隔离和保护。与现有的隔离技术不同,SICE不依赖于主机环境中的任何软件组件(即操作系统或管理程序)。相反,隔离环境的安全性由一个仅包括硬件、BIOS和系统管理模式(SMM)的可信计算基础来保证。SICE提供与隔离环境之间的快速上下文切换,允许隔离的工作负载与不受信任的工作负载共享物理平台。此外,SICE支持大范围(高达4GB)的隔离内存。最后,SICE最独特的特性是使用多核处理器,允许隔离的环境在不受信任的主机旁边并发地安全地运行。我们已经使用AMD x86硬件平台实现了一个SICE原型。我们的实验表明,SICE在隔离环境之间执行快速上下文切换(67微秒),并且它对隔离的Linux虚拟机的操作施加了合理的开销(除了一个基准测试之外,所有基准测试都是3%)。我们的原型表明,经过对BIOS软件和SMM硬件实现的仔细安全审查,当前的硬件体系结构已经提供了一些抽象,可以使用大约300行代码的非常小的SMM软件基础来支持构建强大的隔离机制。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
SICE: a hardware-level strongly isolated computing environment for x86 multi-core platforms
SICE is a novel framework to provide hardware-level isolation and protection for sensitive workloads running on x86 platforms in compute clouds. Unlike existing isolation techniques, SICE does not rely on any software component in the host environment (i.e., an OS or a hypervisor). Instead, the security of the isolated environments is guaranteed by a trusted computing base that only includes the hardware, the BIOS, and the System Management Mode (SMM). SICE provides fast context switching to and from an isolated environment, allowing isolated workloads to time-share the physical platform with untrusted workloads. Moreover, SICE supports a large range (up to 4GB) of isolated memory. Finally, the most unique feature of SICE is the use of multicore processors to allow the isolated environments to run concurrently and yet securely beside the untrusted host. We have implemented a SICE prototype using an AMD x86 hardware platform. Our experiments show that SICE performs fast context switching (67 microseconds) to and from the isolated environment and that it imposes a reasonable overhead (3% on all but one benchmark) on the operation of an isolated Linux virtual machine. Our prototype demonstrates that, subject to a careful security review of the BIOS software and the SMM hardware implementation, current hardware architecture already provides abstractions that can support building strong isolation mechanisms using a very small SMM software foundation of about 300 lines of code.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
9.20
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信