{"title":"具有冲突的动态控制系统纳什均衡的pareto最优性","authors":"M.B. Mamedov","doi":"10.1016/0041-5553(90)90039-U","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Sufficient conditions are derived for the Pareto-optimality of an equilibrium. A class of positional differential games satisfying these conditions are considered. In other words, equilibria that are unimprovable in the equilibrium set are Pareto-optimal, i.e., unimprovable among all the situations of the game.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":101271,"journal":{"name":"USSR Computational Mathematics and Mathematical Physics","volume":"30 4","pages":"Pages 16-24"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1990-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/0041-5553(90)90039-U","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Pareto-optimality of nash equilibrium in dynamic controlled systems with conflict\",\"authors\":\"M.B. Mamedov\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/0041-5553(90)90039-U\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>Sufficient conditions are derived for the Pareto-optimality of an equilibrium. A class of positional differential games satisfying these conditions are considered. In other words, equilibria that are unimprovable in the equilibrium set are Pareto-optimal, i.e., unimprovable among all the situations of the game.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":101271,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"USSR Computational Mathematics and Mathematical Physics\",\"volume\":\"30 4\",\"pages\":\"Pages 16-24\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1990-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/0041-5553(90)90039-U\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"USSR Computational Mathematics and Mathematical Physics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/004155539090039U\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"USSR Computational Mathematics and Mathematical Physics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/004155539090039U","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Pareto-optimality of nash equilibrium in dynamic controlled systems with conflict
Sufficient conditions are derived for the Pareto-optimality of an equilibrium. A class of positional differential games satisfying these conditions are considered. In other words, equilibria that are unimprovable in the equilibrium set are Pareto-optimal, i.e., unimprovable among all the situations of the game.
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