股东提案会伤害股东吗?来自证券交易委员会不采取行动信函决定的证据

J. Matsusaka, O. Ozbas, Irene Yi
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引用次数: 6

摘要

本文研究了美国证券交易委员会(SEC)决定公司是否可以从其代理声明中排除股东建议的不作为函决定。在2007年至2019年期间,当美国证交会允许排除时,市场反应积极,这表明投资者认为这些提议平均而言会降低价值。我们还发现,在等待SEC裁决的过程中,公司股价会随着时间的推移而下跌,这表明受到质疑的提案给公司带来了分散注意力的成本。监管规则可以预测SEC的决定,但也与提案的预期投票有关——更受欢迎的提案被删除的可能性更小。我们没有发现强有力的证据表明,当美国证券交易委员会由民主党与共和党控制时,不采取行动的决定有所不同。综上所述,有证据表明,管理者反对某些提案可能是为了维护股东利益,而不采取行动的信函程序可能会通过淘汰降低价值的提案来帮助股东。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Can Shareholder Proposals Hurt Shareholders? Evidence from Securities and Exchange Commission No-Action-Letter Decisions
This paper studies Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) no-action-letter decisions that determine whether companies can exclude shareholder proposals from their proxy statements. During 2007–19, the market reacted positively when the SEC permitted exclusion, which suggests that investors viewed those proposals as value reducing on average. We also find that a company’s stock price decreased over time while waiting for an SEC decision, which suggests that challenged proposals imposed distraction costs on companies. The SEC’s decisions can be predicted by regulatory rules but are also related to a proposal’s predicted votes—more popular types of proposals were less likely to be removed. We find no robust evidence that no-action-letter decisions differed when the SEC was controlled by Democrats versus Republicans. Taken together, the evidence suggests that managers may be serving shareholder interests in opposing some proposals and that the no-action-letter process may be helping shareholders by weeding out value-reducing proposals.
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