多家大股东在派息中的作用:来自印度的证据

Q4 Business, Management and Accounting
Samridhi Suman, Shveta Singh
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引用次数: 4

摘要

本研究考察了在印度低投资者保护制度下,多个大股东(MLS)对公司股息支付的影响,在印度,小股东的征用问题严重,公司有建立资本市场声誉的动机。因此,我们主张替代假说的普遍性,即MLS合作支付更大的股息,以减轻对声誉建设的征用问题。以2009 - 2019年NIFTY 500指数上市的MLS非金融公司为例的实证分析表明,控股股东和MLS对股息支付强度均有正向影响。其他分析还表明,MLS的积极作用在从事股票发行的成长型公司和董事会独立性较低的公司中是突出的。我们还发现,当机构投资者是第二大股东时,公司的派息相对较低。进一步,研究表明,MLS参与更大的股息平滑。最后,我们观察到,对于拥有更高MLS所有权的公司,股息更有价值。总之,这些发现支持替代假说。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Role of Multiple Large Shareholders in Dividend Payouts: Evidence from India
This study examines the impact of multiple large shareholders (MLS) on a firm’s dividend payouts in a low-investor protection regime, India, where minority shareholders’ expropriation concerns are severe and firms have an incentive to build a capital market reputation. Therefore, we purport for the prevalence of the substitution hypothesis, whereby MLS cooperate in paying larger dividends to assuage expropriation concerns for reputation-building. The empirical analysis using non-financial firms with MLS listed on NIFTY 500 from 2009 to 2019 yields that both the controlling owner and MLS positively influence dividend payout intensity. Additional analyses also demonstrate that the positive effect of MLS is prominent in growing firms that undertake equity issuances and firms with lower board independence. We also find that firms make relatively lower payouts when an institutional investor is the second largest shareholder. Further, it is shown that MLS engage in greater dividend smoothing. Lastly, it is observed that dividends are more valuable for firms with higher MLS ownership. Altogether, these findings support the substitution hypothesis.
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来源期刊
American Business Review
American Business Review Business, Management and Accounting-Business, Management and Accounting (miscellaneous)
CiteScore
1.00
自引率
0.00%
发文量
13
审稿时长
8 weeks
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