{"title":"议价随机模型中均衡收益的唯一性","authors":"Kirill S. Evdokimov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3491443","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I provide a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs in a model of stochastic bargaining with unanimity rule and risk-averse players. My Condition (S) implies Condition (C) of Merlo and Wilson (1995) and is easy to verify in applications.","PeriodicalId":11757,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: General Equilibrium & Disequilibrium Models of Financial Markets (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Uniqueness of Equilibrium Payoffs in the Stochastic Model of Bargaining\",\"authors\":\"Kirill S. Evdokimov\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3491443\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract I provide a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs in a model of stochastic bargaining with unanimity rule and risk-averse players. My Condition (S) implies Condition (C) of Merlo and Wilson (1995) and is easy to verify in applications.\",\"PeriodicalId\":11757,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: Other Microeconomics: General Equilibrium & Disequilibrium Models of Financial Markets (Topic)\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-11-15\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: Other Microeconomics: General Equilibrium & Disequilibrium Models of Financial Markets (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3491443\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: General Equilibrium & Disequilibrium Models of Financial Markets (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3491443","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Uniqueness of Equilibrium Payoffs in the Stochastic Model of Bargaining
Abstract I provide a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs in a model of stochastic bargaining with unanimity rule and risk-averse players. My Condition (S) implies Condition (C) of Merlo and Wilson (1995) and is easy to verify in applications.