绿色反垄断:对抗气候变化中的友军火力

M. Schinkel, L. Treuren
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引用次数: 12

摘要

绿色反垄断运动旨在通过允许限制竞争来增加可持续发展的努力。然而,迄今为止的经济证据表明,更多(而不是更少)的竞争才是促使可持续发展努力的正确刺激因素。与允许企业签订可持续性协议相比,企业通过竞争来生产更可持续产品的动机更强。当公司有促进可持续发展的内在动机时,这也是正确的。为了适应罕见的真正的可持续性协议而放松一般竞争规则并不是一个好政策。无论意图多么美好,绿色反垄断都有可能损害竞争和环境。它将抑制促使企业生产更具可持续性产品的市场力量的聚集,使竞争监管机构负担过重,引发卡特尔滥用“洗绿”行为,并让本应促进可持续性的政府部门有更多借口逃避设计适当监管的责任。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Green Antitrust: Friendly Fire in the Fight against Climate Change
The green antitrust movement aims to increase sustainability efforts by allowing restrictions of competition. Yet the economic evidence so far points to more, not less, competition as the right stimulus for inducing sustainability efforts. Incentives to produce more sustainably are stronger when firms compete than when they are allowed to make sustainability agreements. This is also true when firms are intrinsically motivated to promote sustainability. It is not good policy to relax the general competition rules in order to accommodate the rare genuine sustainability agreement. However well-intended, green antitrust risks damaging both competition and the environment. It will suppress the gathering market forces for companies to produce more sustainably, overburden competition authorities, invite abusive cartel greenwashing, and give the part of government that should promote sustainability further excuse to shun their responsibility for designing proper regulation.
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