{"title":"问题:人类最终是有情感的吗?","authors":"E. Brann","doi":"10.1558/EXPO.V1I1.53","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper considers arguments for finding human beings to be centrally rational or basically affective. The former view, initiated by the predominant philosophers of antiquity, prevailed in the West until Spinoza and (among those after him) Heidegger made affectivity primary. The thesis is that this choice is not primarily psychological but ontological and that the question must be pursued metaphysically.","PeriodicalId":30121,"journal":{"name":"Expositions Interdisciplinary Studies in the Humanities","volume":"102 1","pages":"53-70"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2007-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Question: Are Human Beings Ultimately Affective?\",\"authors\":\"E. Brann\",\"doi\":\"10.1558/EXPO.V1I1.53\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper considers arguments for finding human beings to be centrally rational or basically affective. The former view, initiated by the predominant philosophers of antiquity, prevailed in the West until Spinoza and (among those after him) Heidegger made affectivity primary. The thesis is that this choice is not primarily psychological but ontological and that the question must be pursued metaphysically.\",\"PeriodicalId\":30121,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Expositions Interdisciplinary Studies in the Humanities\",\"volume\":\"102 1\",\"pages\":\"53-70\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2007-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Expositions Interdisciplinary Studies in the Humanities\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1558/EXPO.V1I1.53\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Expositions Interdisciplinary Studies in the Humanities","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1558/EXPO.V1I1.53","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper considers arguments for finding human beings to be centrally rational or basically affective. The former view, initiated by the predominant philosophers of antiquity, prevailed in the West until Spinoza and (among those after him) Heidegger made affectivity primary. The thesis is that this choice is not primarily psychological but ontological and that the question must be pursued metaphysically.