{"title":"系统性操作风险——障眼法","authors":"P. Mcconnell","doi":"10.21314/JOP.2012.109","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Christmas 2009 did not bring much festive cheer to the shareholders of Australia's largest banks. On December 23rd, the so-called Four Pillars announced simultaneously that their subsidiaries in New Zealand had settled with the NZ Inland Revenue Department (IRD), in respect of long-running litigation that resulted in payments of unpaid tax and interest totaling some NZ$ 2.2 Billion. The settlement followed a finding in October 2009, in the High Court of New Zealand, in favor of the local tax authorities as regards a series of 'Structured Finance Transactions', which the IRD claimed were specifically designed to avoid paying tax in New Zealand. The transactions in dispute, which numbered only around 30 across the four banks, were, at face value, highly complex and intricate but when stripped of the 'smoke and mirrors' were little more than standard commercial loans. The profitability, or otherwise, of these disputed transactions depended very much on how profits, losses and tax were accounted for. Because of various tax treaties between New Zealand and Australia, the Australian parents of NZ banks are able, under certain circumstances, to offset operating losses against profits being repatriated from New Zealand. This, in effect, could turn a loss-making transaction into a powerful device for shielding profits from tax, for both the borrower and the lender. The Inland Revenue argued that the tax benefit was, in fact, the 'tax tail that wagged the commercial dog ' in such transactions. New Zealand courts at various levels agreed with this interpretation and unanimously found that the banks concerned were using these transactions to avoid paying tax.This paper argues that the losses to the Australian banks incurred as a result of the NZ Tax Scandal were, in most part, a result of Systemic Operational Risk, in particular, Legal Risk. Using examples from published court cases, the paper identifies some of the Legal Risks that arose using these transactions. The paper then suggests proactive approaches to Systemic Risk Management that should help detect and minimize the impact of similar scandals in future.","PeriodicalId":54030,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Operational Risk","volume":"77 1","pages":"119-164"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4000,"publicationDate":"2012-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"9","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Systemic Operational Risk – Smoke and Mirrors\",\"authors\":\"P. Mcconnell\",\"doi\":\"10.21314/JOP.2012.109\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Christmas 2009 did not bring much festive cheer to the shareholders of Australia's largest banks. On December 23rd, the so-called Four Pillars announced simultaneously that their subsidiaries in New Zealand had settled with the NZ Inland Revenue Department (IRD), in respect of long-running litigation that resulted in payments of unpaid tax and interest totaling some NZ$ 2.2 Billion. The settlement followed a finding in October 2009, in the High Court of New Zealand, in favor of the local tax authorities as regards a series of 'Structured Finance Transactions', which the IRD claimed were specifically designed to avoid paying tax in New Zealand. The transactions in dispute, which numbered only around 30 across the four banks, were, at face value, highly complex and intricate but when stripped of the 'smoke and mirrors' were little more than standard commercial loans. The profitability, or otherwise, of these disputed transactions depended very much on how profits, losses and tax were accounted for. Because of various tax treaties between New Zealand and Australia, the Australian parents of NZ banks are able, under certain circumstances, to offset operating losses against profits being repatriated from New Zealand. This, in effect, could turn a loss-making transaction into a powerful device for shielding profits from tax, for both the borrower and the lender. The Inland Revenue argued that the tax benefit was, in fact, the 'tax tail that wagged the commercial dog ' in such transactions. New Zealand courts at various levels agreed with this interpretation and unanimously found that the banks concerned were using these transactions to avoid paying tax.This paper argues that the losses to the Australian banks incurred as a result of the NZ Tax Scandal were, in most part, a result of Systemic Operational Risk, in particular, Legal Risk. Using examples from published court cases, the paper identifies some of the Legal Risks that arose using these transactions. The paper then suggests proactive approaches to Systemic Risk Management that should help detect and minimize the impact of similar scandals in future.\",\"PeriodicalId\":54030,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Operational Risk\",\"volume\":\"77 1\",\"pages\":\"119-164\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2012-07-07\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"9\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Operational Risk\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.21314/JOP.2012.109\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Operational Risk","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.21314/JOP.2012.109","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Christmas 2009 did not bring much festive cheer to the shareholders of Australia's largest banks. On December 23rd, the so-called Four Pillars announced simultaneously that their subsidiaries in New Zealand had settled with the NZ Inland Revenue Department (IRD), in respect of long-running litigation that resulted in payments of unpaid tax and interest totaling some NZ$ 2.2 Billion. The settlement followed a finding in October 2009, in the High Court of New Zealand, in favor of the local tax authorities as regards a series of 'Structured Finance Transactions', which the IRD claimed were specifically designed to avoid paying tax in New Zealand. The transactions in dispute, which numbered only around 30 across the four banks, were, at face value, highly complex and intricate but when stripped of the 'smoke and mirrors' were little more than standard commercial loans. The profitability, or otherwise, of these disputed transactions depended very much on how profits, losses and tax were accounted for. Because of various tax treaties between New Zealand and Australia, the Australian parents of NZ banks are able, under certain circumstances, to offset operating losses against profits being repatriated from New Zealand. This, in effect, could turn a loss-making transaction into a powerful device for shielding profits from tax, for both the borrower and the lender. The Inland Revenue argued that the tax benefit was, in fact, the 'tax tail that wagged the commercial dog ' in such transactions. New Zealand courts at various levels agreed with this interpretation and unanimously found that the banks concerned were using these transactions to avoid paying tax.This paper argues that the losses to the Australian banks incurred as a result of the NZ Tax Scandal were, in most part, a result of Systemic Operational Risk, in particular, Legal Risk. Using examples from published court cases, the paper identifies some of the Legal Risks that arose using these transactions. The paper then suggests proactive approaches to Systemic Risk Management that should help detect and minimize the impact of similar scandals in future.
期刊介绍:
In December 2017, the Basel Committee published the final version of its standardized measurement approach (SMA) methodology, which will replace the approaches set out in Basel II (ie, the simpler standardized approaches and advanced measurement approach (AMA) that allowed use of internal models) from January 1, 2022. Independently of the Basel III rules, in order to manage and mitigate risks, they still need to be measurable by anyone. The operational risk industry needs to keep that in mind. While the purpose of the now defunct AMA was to find out the level of regulatory capital to protect a firm against operational risks, we still can – and should – use models to estimate operational risk economic capital. Without these, the task of managing and mitigating capital would be incredibly difficult. These internal models are now unshackled from regulatory requirements and can be optimized for managing the daily risks to which financial institutions are exposed. In addition, operational risk models can and should be used for stress tests and Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR). The Journal of Operational Risk also welcomes papers on nonfinancial risks as well as topics including, but not limited to, the following. The modeling and management of operational risk. Recent advances in techniques used to model operational risk, eg, copulas, correlation, aggregate loss distributions, Bayesian methods and extreme value theory. The pricing and hedging of operational risk and/or any risk transfer techniques. Data modeling external loss data, business control factors and scenario analysis. Models used to aggregate different types of data. Causal models that link key risk indicators and macroeconomic factors to operational losses. Regulatory issues, such as Basel II or any other local regulatory issue. Enterprise risk management. Cyber risk. Big data.