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引用次数: 2
摘要
K. Świętorzecka所提出的变化逻辑,其动机来自亚里士多德的实体变化理论,它被理解为个体实体的消失和生成的转化。转换:变成/消失(和相反)由原始操作符C表示,待读:它改变了…,并由逐步扩展的语言映射。我们对单个物质的属性变化感兴趣。我们考虑一个具有两个非正态和不可互定义的可能和必要变化算子的形式主义,灵感来自亚里士多德对偶然属性和本质属性的区分。我们采用了时间概念通过变化操作符定义的思想,以及扩展语言的思想。接下来,我们将我们的新逻辑公理化,并描述它的语义,给出它的完备性的证明。我们将我们的形式主义与选定的模态逻辑进行比较。
ABSTRACT The logic of change formulated by K. Świętorzecka, has its motivation coming from the Aristotelian theory of substantial change which is undrstood as a transformation consisting in the disappearing and becoming of individual substances. The transition: becoming/disapearing (and conversely) is expressed in by the primitive operator C, to be read: it changes that …, and it is mapped by the progressively expanding language. We are interested in attributive changes of individual substances. We consider a formalism with two non-normal and not mutually definable operators of possible and necessary change, inspired by Aristotelian distinction of accidental and essential attributes. From we adopt the idea that temporal concepts are defined via change operators, and the idea of an expanding language. In what follows, We axiomatise our new logic and describe its semantics, giving the proof of its completeness. We compare our formalism with selected modal logics.