带延期补货的团购拍卖的最优阈值

2009 16th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management Pub Date : 2009-12-04 DOI:10.1109/ICIEEM.2009.5344609

Li Du, Jiejian Feng

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引用次数: 2

摘要

团购拍卖是B2C市场中常用的一种方式。卖方在这里获得了数量折扣价格合同，并实施了延期补货政策。我们发现，当顾客的估价服从均匀分布时，团购拍卖并不总是优于固定定价。最优团购阈值仅取决于采购成本、价格和顾客评价的上限。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Optimal threshold in the group-buying auction with replenishment postponement

The group-buying auction is often used in the B2C market. The seller here is offered a quantity-discount-price contract and implements a replenishment postponement policy. We show that when customer's valuation follows a uniform distribution, the group-buying auction does not always outperform the fixed pricing. The optimal group-buying threshold is shown to depend on only purchasing costs, prices and the upper bound of customer's valuation.

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2009 16th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

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