{"title":"Tapir:一种用于验证OS内核探测的语言","authors":"Ilya Yanok, Nathaniel Nystrom","doi":"10.1145/2883591.2883602","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Kernel probes allow code to be inserted into a running operating system kernel to gather information for debugging or profiling. Inserting code into the kernel raises a number of safety issues. Current solutions follow one of the two paths: a VM-based approach, where safety properties are checked dynamically by an interpreter, or a static-analysis approach, where probe code is guaranteed to be safe statically. While more attractive, existing static solutions depend on ad-hoc and error-prone analysis. We propose to explore enforcing safety properties using a type system, thus building our analysis on top of the well-studied ground of type theory.","PeriodicalId":7046,"journal":{"name":"ACM SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev.","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Tapir: A Language for Verified OS Kernel Probes\",\"authors\":\"Ilya Yanok, Nathaniel Nystrom\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/2883591.2883602\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Kernel probes allow code to be inserted into a running operating system kernel to gather information for debugging or profiling. Inserting code into the kernel raises a number of safety issues. Current solutions follow one of the two paths: a VM-based approach, where safety properties are checked dynamically by an interpreter, or a static-analysis approach, where probe code is guaranteed to be safe statically. While more attractive, existing static solutions depend on ad-hoc and error-prone analysis. We propose to explore enforcing safety properties using a type system, thus building our analysis on top of the well-studied ground of type theory.\",\"PeriodicalId\":7046,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ACM SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev.\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2016-01-20\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ACM SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev.\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/2883591.2883602\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ACM SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev.","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2883591.2883602","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Kernel probes allow code to be inserted into a running operating system kernel to gather information for debugging or profiling. Inserting code into the kernel raises a number of safety issues. Current solutions follow one of the two paths: a VM-based approach, where safety properties are checked dynamically by an interpreter, or a static-analysis approach, where probe code is guaranteed to be safe statically. While more attractive, existing static solutions depend on ad-hoc and error-prone analysis. We propose to explore enforcing safety properties using a type system, thus building our analysis on top of the well-studied ground of type theory.