补救网络劫持:通知有效性和网站管理员理解

Frank H. Li, Grant Ho, Eric Kuan, Yuan Niu, L. Ballard, Kurt Thomas, Elie Bursztein, V. Paxson
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引用次数: 56

摘要

由于不法分子每周都会劫持数千个易受攻击的网络服务器,以获取廉价的托管服务和流量,安全服务部门已经转向通知,提醒网站管理员正在发生的事件,并加快恢复速度。在这项工作中,我们提出了第一个大规模的测量研究,研究了浏览器、搜索和直接网站管理员通知组合在减少网站受损持续时间方面的有效性。我们的研究捕获了2014年7月至2015年6月期间760,935起劫持事件的生命周期,这些事件由谷歌安全浏览和搜索质量确定。我们观察到,与网站管理员的直接沟通增加了50%以上的清除可能性,并减少了至少62%的感染时间。如果没有这种开放的沟通渠道,我们发现浏览器插页广告——虽然旨在提醒访问者注意潜在的有害内容——与更快的修复相关。作为我们研究的一部分,我们还探讨了网站管理员是否表现出必要的技术专长来解决劫持事件。根据网站管理员提醒谷歌他们的网站不再受到威胁的申诉日志,我们发现80%的运营商在第一次申诉时就成功地清除了症状。然而,相当一部分网站所有者没有解决入侵的根本原因,超过12%的网站在30天内成为新攻击的受害者。我们将这些发现提炼成一组建议,以提高网络安全性,并为网站管理员提供最佳实践。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Remedying Web Hijacking: Notification Effectiveness and Webmaster Comprehension
As miscreants routinely hijack thousands of vulnerable web servers weekly for cheap hosting and traffic acquisition, security services have turned to notifications both to alert webmasters of ongoing incidents as well as to expedite recovery. In this work we present the first large-scale measurement study on the effectiveness of combinations of browser, search, and direct webmaster notifications at reducing the duration a site remains compromised. Our study captures the life cycle of 760,935 hijacking incidents from July, 2014--June, 2015, as identified by Google Safe Browsing and Search Quality. We observe that direct communication with webmasters increases the likelihood of cleanup by over 50% and reduces infection lengths by at least 62%. Absent this open channel for communication, we find browser interstitials---while intended to alert visitors to potentially harmful content---correlate with faster remediation. As part of our study, we also explore whether webmasters exhibit the necessary technical expertise to address hijacking incidents. Based on appeal logs where webmasters alert Google that their site is no longer compromised, we find 80% of operators successfully clean up symptoms on their first appeal. However, a sizeable fraction of site owners do not address the root cause of compromise, with over 12% of sites falling victim to a new attack within 30 days. We distill these findings into a set of recommendations for improving web security and best practices for webmasters.
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