塞耶式对国会和最高法院绝对多数原则的服从:来自过去的教训

IF 1.5 3区 社会学 Q1 LAW
Evan H. Caminker
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引用次数: 6

摘要

在过去的8年里,最高法院在对以联邦制为由受到质疑的联邦法规进行司法审查时,异乎寻常地咄咄逼人。法院曾11次在认定国会超越其有限监管权限后,宣布联邦法规条款无效;在11个案件中,有10个案件的投票结果是5比4。许多学者最近考虑了国会既可以在最高法院规定的新理论约束下工作,又可以完全绕过这些约束的方法。在这篇研讨会论文中,我探讨了一种更直接的国会机制,以缓和法院咄咄逼人的审查:在法院以联邦制为由宣布联邦法规无效之前,强制实行绝对多数共识要求(例如,六名大法官而不是五名)。虽然在今天几乎闻所未闻,但在我们历史的早期,特别是在进步时代,这是一项受欢迎的国会提案。事实上,在此期间通过绝对多数协议的两个国家今天仍在这样的规则下运作。当时的想法是,这样的绝对多数要求将使主流观点(当时普遍与詹姆斯·布拉德利·塞耶(James Bradley Thayer)联系在一起)制度化,即法院不应使联邦法规无效,除非它被认为是违宪的,“毫无合理怀疑”。在这篇文章中,我将对今天这样一项提议的合宪性和逻辑可行性提出质疑,并简单地将绝对多数概念作为一个启发式镜头,通过它来探索将今天法院更宽松地表述为“合宪性推定”的东西制度化的不同方式。借鉴进步时代的辩论,我试图对这种假设的运作提供新的见解,并提醒我们,那些主张在联邦制(或任何其他)背景下加强这种假设的人,还有一种额外的机制可供考虑。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Thayerian Deference to Congress and Supreme Court Supermajority Rule: Lessons from the Past
Over the past eight years, the Supreme Court has been unusually aggressive in its exercise of judicial review over federal statutes challenged on federalism grounds. Eleven times the Court has invalidated provisions in federal statutes after determining that Congress exceeded the scope of its limited regulatory authority; in ten of the eleven cases, the vote was five-to-four. Many scholars have recently considered ways in which Congress can either work within the new doctrinal constraints laid down by the Court, or circumvent those constraints entirely. In this Symposium Essay, I explore a more direct congressional mechanism for tempering the Court's aggressive review: imposition of a supermajority consensus requirement (say, six Justices rather than five) before the Court can invalidate a federal statute on federalism grounds. While virtually unheard-of today, this was a popular congressional proposal at earlier times in our history, especially during the Progressive Era. Indeed, two states that adopted a supermajority protocol during that period still operate under such a rule today. The notion was that such a supermajority requirement would institutionalize the prevailing view (then generally associated with James Bradley Thayer) that the Court shouldn't invalidate a federal statute unless it was perceived to be unconstitutional "beyond reasonable doubt." In this Essay I bracket questions regarding the constitutionality and logistical feasibility of such a proposal today, and simply use the supermajority concept as a heuristic lens through which to explore different ways of institutionalizing what today's Court would articulate more loosely as a "presumption of constitutionality." Drawing upon the Progressive Era debates, I try to offer new insights into the operation of such a presumption, as well as to remind us of an additional mechanism for consideration by those who would advocate beefing up this presumption in the federalism (or any other) context.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: Founded in 1925, the Indiana Law Journal is a general-interest academic legal journal. The Indiana Law Journal is published quarterly by students of the Indiana University Maurer School of Law — Bloomington. The opportunity to become a member of the Journal is available to all students at the end of their first-year. Members are selected in one of two ways. First, students in the top of their class academically are automatically invited to become members. Second, a blind-graded writing competition is held to fill the remaining slots. This competition tests students" Bluebook skills and legal writing ability. Overall, approximately thirty-five offers are extended each year. Candidates who accept their offers make a two-year commitment to the Journal.
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