近似纳什均衡的通信复杂性

Proceedings of the 49th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing Pub Date : 2016-08-23 DOI:10.1145/3055399.3055407

Y. Babichenko, A. Rubinstein

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引用次数: 31

摘要

对于一个常数ε，我们证明了在双玩家N x N博弈中ϵ-Nash均衡的(随机)通信复杂度的(N)下界。对于n人二元动作游戏，我们证明了(随机)通信复杂度(λ， λ)-弱近似纳什均衡的exp(n)下界，这是混合动作的一个特征，使得至少(1- λ)-部分玩家回复ϵ-best。

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Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria

For a constant ϵ, we prove a (N) lower bound on the (randomized) communication complexity of ϵ-Nash equilibrium in two-player N x N games. For n-player binary-action games we prove an exp(n) lower bound for the (randomized) communication complexity of (ϵ,ϵ)-weak approximate Nash equilibrium, which is a profile of mixed actions such that at least (1-ϵ)-fraction of the players are ϵ-best replying.

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Proceedings of the 49th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing

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