Mengchen Dong, Jan‐Willem van Prooijen, P. V. van Lange
{"title":"地位较高的人的战略性剥削招致更严厉的第三方惩罚","authors":"Mengchen Dong, Jan‐Willem van Prooijen, P. V. van Lange","doi":"10.1027/1864-9335/a000493","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract. It is widely documented that third parties punish norm violations, even at a substantial cost to themselves. However, little is known about how third-party punishment occurs in groups consisting of members who differ in status. Having a higher-status member promotes norm enforcement and group efficiency but also poses threats to collective goods when they strategically exploit people’s trust to maximize self-interest. Two preregistered studies consistently revealed a punitive mechanism contingent on target status and strategic exploitation. Third-party observers generated harsher punishment when high- but not low-status targets transgressed after publicly endorsing cooperation (Study 1) or procedural fairness (Study 2). The findings elucidate third-party punishment as a feasible mechanism to counteract exploitation and maintain social norms in interactions with status asymmetry.","PeriodicalId":47278,"journal":{"name":"Social Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2000,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Strategic Exploitation by Higher-Status People Incurs Harsher Third-Party Punishment\",\"authors\":\"Mengchen Dong, Jan‐Willem van Prooijen, P. V. van Lange\",\"doi\":\"10.1027/1864-9335/a000493\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract. It is widely documented that third parties punish norm violations, even at a substantial cost to themselves. However, little is known about how third-party punishment occurs in groups consisting of members who differ in status. Having a higher-status member promotes norm enforcement and group efficiency but also poses threats to collective goods when they strategically exploit people’s trust to maximize self-interest. Two preregistered studies consistently revealed a punitive mechanism contingent on target status and strategic exploitation. Third-party observers generated harsher punishment when high- but not low-status targets transgressed after publicly endorsing cooperation (Study 1) or procedural fairness (Study 2). The findings elucidate third-party punishment as a feasible mechanism to counteract exploitation and maintain social norms in interactions with status asymmetry.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47278,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Social Psychology\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-07-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Social Psychology\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"102\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1027/1864-9335/a000493\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"心理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIAL\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Social Psychology","FirstCategoryId":"102","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1027/1864-9335/a000493","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIAL","Score":null,"Total":0}
Strategic Exploitation by Higher-Status People Incurs Harsher Third-Party Punishment
Abstract. It is widely documented that third parties punish norm violations, even at a substantial cost to themselves. However, little is known about how third-party punishment occurs in groups consisting of members who differ in status. Having a higher-status member promotes norm enforcement and group efficiency but also poses threats to collective goods when they strategically exploit people’s trust to maximize self-interest. Two preregistered studies consistently revealed a punitive mechanism contingent on target status and strategic exploitation. Third-party observers generated harsher punishment when high- but not low-status targets transgressed after publicly endorsing cooperation (Study 1) or procedural fairness (Study 2). The findings elucidate third-party punishment as a feasible mechanism to counteract exploitation and maintain social norms in interactions with status asymmetry.