影子银行与金融科技抵押贷款证券化

Yu An, Lei Li, Zhaogang Song
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引用次数: 2

摘要

机构MBS发行人可以在三种证券化场所中进行选择:个人证券化,发行人使用自己的贷款创建MBS;集体证券化,不同的发行人将贷款交付给共同的MBS;现金窗口,发行人通过向房利美或房地美出售贷款立即获得现金支付,然后由房利美或房地美进行证券化。我们发现,具有更大即时流动性需求的发行人(例如,较小的发行人和影子银行)通过现金窗口证券化的贷款比例更大。集体证券化的统一定价特征导致了贷款价值相对较高的传统银行对贷款价值相对较低的影子银行,特别是金融科技发行人的交叉补贴,影子银行和传统银行分别倾向于集体证券化和个人证券化。我们进一步利用房利美对集体证券化的政策冲击和COVID-19对现金窗口的冲击,证明证券化场所影响发行人证券化贷款的质量和数量。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Shadow Bank and Fintech Mortgage Securitization
Agency MBS issuers can choose among three securitization venues: individual securitization where an issuer uses her own loans to create an MBS, collective securitization where different issuers deliver loans into a common MBS, and cash window where issuers receive immediate cash payment by selling loans to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, who then conduct securitization. We find that issuers with greater immediate liquidity needs (e.g., smaller issuers and shadow banks) have a larger fraction of their loans securitized through cash window. The uniform pricing feature of collective securitization results in cross-subsidy from traditional banks, who have relatively high-value loans, to shadow banks, especially fintech issuers, who have relatively low-value loans;hence, shadow banks and traditional banks prefer collective and individual securitization, respectively. We further show that securitization venues affect the quality and quantity of loans that issuers securitize, using Fannie Mae's policy shock on collective securitization and the COVID-19 shock on cash window.
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