看似无可比拟和理性的选择

IF 1.6 2区 哲学 Q2 ETHICS
L. Yan
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们有时不得不在看似无法比较的选项之间做出选择,因为它们似乎既不比彼此好,也不比彼此差,也不等于彼此。这种情况通常发生在可用选项彼此差别很大的情况下。例如,考虑将刑事司法改革或医疗改革作为公共政策目标的优先选择。即使在目标和可能的改革的相关细节被填写之后,似乎没有一个目标比另一个更好,更差,也不等于另一个目标。这些看似不可比较的选项给理性选择带来了问题,因为不清楚代理人如何在它们之间进行理性选择。我们需要的是一些原则,帮助我们在面对看似无可比拟的选择时进行理性选择。我在这里提出三条这样的原则。虽然每个原则单独都是令人信服的,但我表明它们联合起来是不相容的。然后,我认为,对这种不一致的三重性的正确反应是拒绝理性地谴责人们明知会导致次优结果的一系列选择的原则。结果是,当涉及到表面上的不可比较性时,代理人可以在不减少理性的情况下为自己赚钱。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Seeming incomparability and rational choice
We sometimes have to choose between options that are seemingly incomparable insofar as they seem to be neither better than, worse than, nor equal to each other. This often happens when the available options are quite different from one another. For instance, consider a choice between prioritizing either criminal justice reform or healthcare reform as a public policy goal. Even after the relevant details of the goals and possible reforms are filled in, it is plausible that neither goal is better than, worse than, nor equal to the other. Such seemingly incomparable options present a problem for rational choice since it is unclear how an agent might rationally choose between them. What we need are some principles to help govern rational choice when faced with seemingly incomparable options. I here present three such principles. While each principle is individually compelling, I show that they are jointly incompatible. I then argue that the correct response to this inconsistent triad is to reject the principle that rationally censures performing a sequence of choices one knows will result in a suboptimal outcome. The upshot is that when seeming incomparability is involved, an agent can money pump themselves without being less rational for it.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
0.00%
发文量
20
期刊介绍: Politics, Philosophy & Economics aims to bring moral, economic and political theory to bear on the analysis, justification and criticism of political and economic institutions and public policies. The Editors are committed to publishing peer-reviewed papers of high quality using various methodologies from a wide variety of normative perspectives. They seek to provide a distinctive forum for discussions and debates among political scientists, philosophers, and economists on such matters as constitutional design, property rights, distributive justice, the welfare state, egalitarianism, the morals of the market, democratic socialism, population ethics, and the evolution of norms.
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