一种抗恐怖分子欺诈和无提取器的匿名距离边界协议

Gildas Avoine, Xavier Bultel, S. Gambs, David Gérault, P. Lafourcade, Cristina Onete, J. Robert
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引用次数: 37

摘要

已经引入了距离边界协议来阻止针对非接触式认证协议的中继攻击。在这种情况下,验证者必须验证不受信任的证明者的凭据。不幸的是,这些协议本身也会受到复杂的威胁,比如恐怖主义欺诈攻击,在这种攻击中,恶意的证明者会帮助同伙进行身份验证。可以证明,保证距离边界协议对这些攻击的抵抗是复杂的。经典的解决方案假设理性的证明者想要保护他们的长期身份验证凭证,即使是对他们的同伙。因此,抗恐怖主义欺诈协议通常依赖于人工提取机制,以确保同伙能够检索其伙伴证明者的凭证,如果他能够进行身份验证的话。我们提出了一种新的方法来获得可证明的抗恐怖主义欺诈协议,该协议不依赖于共犯能够提取任何长期密钥。相反,我们简单地假设他可以重播从证明者那里收到的信息。因此,理性的证明者应该拒绝与第三方合作,如果他们事后可以自由地冒充他们。我们介绍了可证明的安全距离边界协议的通用结构,并给出了该结构的三个实例:(1)有效的对称密钥协议,(2)保护证明者身份免受外部窃听的公钥协议,最后(3)保护证明者身份的完全匿名协议,甚至防止恶意验证者试图分析他们。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A Terrorist-fraud Resistant and Extractor-free Anonymous Distance-bounding Protocol
Distance-bounding protocols have been introduced to thwart relay attacks against contactless authentication protocols. In this context, verifiers have to authenticate the credentials of untrusted provers. Unfortunately, these protocols are themselves subject to complex threats such as terrorist-fraud attacks, in which a malicious prover helps an accomplice to authenticate. Provably guaranteeing the resistance of distance-bounding protocols to these attacks is complex. The classical solutions assume that rational provers want to protect their long-term authentication credentials, even with respect to their accomplices. Thus, terrorist-fraud resistant protocols generally rely on artificial extraction mechanisms, ensuring that an accomplice can retrieve the credential of his partnering prover, if he is able to authenticate. We propose a novel approach to obtain provable terrorist-fraud resistant protocols that does not rely on an accomplice being able to extract any long-term key. Instead, we simply assume that he can replay the information received from the prover. Thus, rational provers should refuse to cooperate with third parties if they can impersonate them freely afterwards. We introduce a generic construction for provably secure distance-bounding protocols, and give three instances of this construction: (1) an efficient symmetric-key protocol, (2) a public-key protocol protecting the identities of provers against external eavesdroppers, and finally (3) a fully anonymous protocol protecting the identities of provers even against malicious verifiers that try to profile them.
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