地理和本地(Dis)优势

IF 0.9 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Saiying Deng, David A. Rakowski
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引用次数: 1

摘要

我们使用单一州市政债券共同基金的独特设置来检验共同基金经理的地理位置与基金绩效之间的关系。我们发现本地基金经理的表现不如非本地市政债券基金经理。此外,我们证明,在地方基金较多的州,地方市政债券基金经理的表现相对较好,这与与这些地区相关的知识溢出、业务联系和网络效应是一致的。在政治诚信水平较高的州,当地人的表现也相对较好,这与这些地区当地基金经理面临的政治压力较小相一致。我们的结果对几个敏感性检查是稳健的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Geography and Local (Dis)advantage
We examine the relationship between the geographic location of mutual fund managers and fund performance using the unique setting of single-state municipal-bond mutual funds. We find that local managers underperform non-local muni-bond fund managers. Furthermore, we document that local muni-bond fund managers perform relatively better in states with more local funds, consistent with knowledge spillovers, business connections and networking effects associated with those areas. Locals also perform relatively better in states with higher levels of political integrity, consistent with less political pressure on local fund managers in these locations. Our results are robust to several sensitivity checks.
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来源期刊
Quarterly Journal of Finance
Quarterly Journal of Finance BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
1.10
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Quarterly Journal of Finance publishes high-quality papers in all areas of finance, including corporate finance, asset pricing, financial econometrics, international finance, macro-finance, behavioral finance, banking and financial intermediation, capital markets, risk management and insurance, derivatives, quantitative finance, corporate governance and compensation, investments and entrepreneurial finance.
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