现代供应链管理中具有资源池的拍卖模型

Lihua Chen, Liying Wang, Yingjie Lan
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引用次数: 2

摘要

本文主要从理论建模的角度研究现代供应链中具有资源池的供需拍卖系统。现代供应链中的供需拍卖制度是制造商和供应商之间的信息共享机制。本文的目的是为了匹配供给和需求,使现代供应链能够实现激励相容和经济效率。本文设计了一个能够整合资源,有效匹配供需的供需拍卖系统。根据维克里拍卖原则,提出了具有资源池的现代供应链拍卖的三种理论模型。它们分别是具有需求资源池的供给拍卖模型、具有供给资源池的需求拍卖模型和具有需求和供给资源池的双重拍卖模型。针对所提出的拍卖模型,采用线性规划的方法给出了三种相应的拍卖过程资源分配算法,研究了所提出的拍卖模型的激励兼容性,并定义了瓦尔拉斯均衡。作者证明了所提算法的解是瓦尔拉斯均衡。通过引入拍卖机制,笔者希望实现以下三个功能。首先是价格挖掘:拍卖是一个有多个参与者的开放机制。每个人都有自己的效用和购买能力。因此,最终价格反映了拍卖的市场价值。二是动态的现代供应链建设:通过拍卖,企业可以有效地找到合适的合作伙伴。第三是资源整合:在商业实践中,特别是在现代供应链拍卖中,拍卖人可以整合资源,联合买家或卖家,以获得更高的拍卖效率。本文根据Vickrey拍卖原理,提出了具有资源池的现代供应链拍卖的三种理论模型和相应的算法,实现了价格挖掘、动态现代供应链构建和资源整合三个功能。此外,这些模型更接近实际情况,在现代供应链管理中可能具有潜在的应用价值。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Auction models with resource pooling in modern supply chain management
Purpose In this paper, the main focus is on supply and demand auction systems with resource pooling in modern supply chain from a theoretical modeling perspective. The supply and demand auction systems in modern supply chains among manufacturers and suppliers serve as information sharing mechanisms. The purpose of this paper is to match the supply and demand such that a modern supply chain can achieve incentive compatibility and economic efficiency. The authors design such a supply and demand auction system that can integrate resources to efficiently match the supply and demand. Design/methodology/approach The authors propose three theoretic models of modern supply chain auctions with resource pooling according to the Vickrey auction principle. They are supply auction model with demand resource pooling, demand auction model with supply resource pooling, and double auction model with demand and supply resource pooling. For the proposed auction models, the authors present three corresponding algorithms to allocate resources in the auction process by linear programming, and study the incentive compatibility and define the Walrasian equilibriums for the proposed auction models. The authors show that the solutions of the proposed algorithms are Walrasian equilibriums. Findings By introducing the auction mechanism, the authors aim to realize the following three functions. First is price mining: auction is an open mechanism with multiple participants. Everyone has his own utility and purchasing ability. So, the final price reflects the market value of the auction. Second is dynamic modern supply chain construction: through auction, firm can find appropriate partner efficiently. Third is resources integration: in business practices, especially in modern supply chain auctions, auctioneers can integrate resources and ally buyers or sellers to gain more efficiency in auctions. Originality/value In the paper, the authors propose three theoretic models and corresponding algorithms of modern supply chain auctions with resource pooling according using the Vickrey auction principle, which achieves three functions: price mining, dynamic modern supply chain construction and resources integrating. Besides, these proposed models are much closer to practical settings and may have potential applications in modern supply chain management.
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