完全信息下的资本配给制

IF 0.6 Q3 Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Economics Bulletin Pub Date : 2015-04-09 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.2433923

A. Chand, Amit R k

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文讨论了在完全信息环境下，两个部门经理从一个公司为其项目争夺资本的资本结构情况。我们考虑可验证的利润，并研究要么接受要么放弃的合同，在这种合同中，经理们私下或公开地向公司要求资金，并向公司提供部分利润。在资本约束下，我们证明了在私人会议中，纯策略不存在子博弈完全纳什均衡(SPNE);但在连续的公开会议中，SPNE存在于纯战略中，对于公司来说，最好在资本约束下运营，以增加管理人员之间的竞争。

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Capital rationing under perfect information

In this paper, we discuss a scenario in capital structure where two divisional managers compete for capital from a firm for their projects in a perfect information setting. We consider verifiable profits and study take-it-or-leave-it contracts where the managers ask for capital from the firm privately or sequentially in public and offer a part of the profit to the firm. Under capital constraint, we demonstrate that in private meeting, there is no sub game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) in pure strategies; but in sequential public meeting, SPNE exists in pure strategies and, for the firm it is better to operate under capital constraint to increase the competition among managers.

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来源期刊

Economics Bulletin ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.60

自引率

0.00%

发文量

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