学习恢复:从传感器攻击中恢复自主网络物理系统

IF 0.5 Q4 COMPUTER SCIENCE, SOFTWARE ENGINEERING
Francis Akowuah, Romesh Prasad, Carlos Omar Espinoza, Fanxin Kong
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引用次数: 5

摘要

自主网络物理系统(CPS)容易受到非侵入性物理攻击,例如超出传统网络安全领域的传感器欺骗攻击。这些攻击引发了大量攻击检测方面的研究,但很少有人关注检测到攻击后该怎么做。需要减轻攻击对系统的影响并恢复系统以继续运行,这就强调了攻击恢复的重要性。只有少数工作解决攻击恢复,但它们都依赖于系统动力学的先验知识。为了克服这一限制,我们提出了一种数据驱动的攻击恢复框架,可以从传感器攻击中恢复CPS。该框架利用异构传感器和历史数据之间的自然冗余进行攻击恢复。该框架主要由状态预测器和数据检查指针两部分组成。首先,在检测到攻击后触发预测器来估计系统状态。我们提出了一种基于深度学习的预测模型,利用异构传感器之间的时间相关性。第二,检查指针在没有检测到攻击时执行。我们提出了一种基于双滑动窗口的检查点协议来删除受损数据,并将可信数据作为状态预测器的输入。第三,我们使用真实的数据集和地面车辆模拟器来实施和评估我们框架的有效性。结果表明,我们的方法可以恢复系统在存在传感器攻击时继续运行。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Recovery-by-Learning: Restoring Autonomous Cyber-physical Systems from Sensor Attacks
Autonomous cyber-physical systems (CPS) are susceptible to non-invasive physical attacks such as sensor spoofing attacks that are beyond the classical cybersecurity domain. These attacks have motivated numerous research efforts on attack detection, but little attention on what to do after detecting an attack. The importance of attack recovery is emphasized by the need to mitigate the attack’s impact on a system and restore it to continue functioning. There are only a few works addressing attack recovery, but they all rely on prior knowledge of system dynamics. To overcome this limitation, we propose Recovery-by-Learning, a data-driven attack recovery framework that restores CPS from sensor attacks. The framework leverages natural redundancy among heterogeneous sensors and historical data for attack recovery. Specially, the framework consists of two major components: state predictor and data checkpointer. First, the predictor is triggered to estimate systems states after the detection of an attack. We propose a deep learning-based prediction model that exploits the temporal correlation among heterogeneous sensors. Second, the checkpointer executes when no attack is detected. We propose a double sliding window based checkpointing protocol to remove compromised data and keep trustful data as input to the state predictor. Third, we implement and evaluate the effectiveness of our framework using a realistic data set and a ground vehicle simulator. The results show that our method restores a system to continue functioning in presence of sensor attacks.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.70
自引率
14.30%
发文量
17
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