{"title":"博伊德-普雷斯科特经济中的金融中介制度与效率","authors":"Yeong-Yuh Chiang, Edward J. Green","doi":"10.1016/S0167-2231(01)00043-4","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We examine the relationship among a liberal financial-market regime, asset-by-asset supervisory assessment of intermediaries' portfolios, and economic efficiency. We show that, in Boyd and Prescott's (<em>JET 1986</em>) model of financial intermediary coalitions, asset-by-asset supervisory assessment in a liberal regime is inefficient for some, but not all, parameters of the economy.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":100218,"journal":{"name":"Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy","volume":"54 1","pages":"Pages 117-129"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2001-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/S0167-2231(01)00043-4","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Financial-intermediation regime and efficiency in a Boyd-Prescott economy\",\"authors\":\"Yeong-Yuh Chiang, Edward J. Green\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/S0167-2231(01)00043-4\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>We examine the relationship among a liberal financial-market regime, asset-by-asset supervisory assessment of intermediaries' portfolios, and economic efficiency. We show that, in Boyd and Prescott's (<em>JET 1986</em>) model of financial intermediary coalitions, asset-by-asset supervisory assessment in a liberal regime is inefficient for some, but not all, parameters of the economy.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":100218,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy\",\"volume\":\"54 1\",\"pages\":\"Pages 117-129\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2001-06-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/S0167-2231(01)00043-4\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167223101000434\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167223101000434","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Financial-intermediation regime and efficiency in a Boyd-Prescott economy
We examine the relationship among a liberal financial-market regime, asset-by-asset supervisory assessment of intermediaries' portfolios, and economic efficiency. We show that, in Boyd and Prescott's (JET 1986) model of financial intermediary coalitions, asset-by-asset supervisory assessment in a liberal regime is inefficient for some, but not all, parameters of the economy.
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