清理互联网的邪恶事物:关于ISP和消费者努力删除Mirai的真实证据

Orçun Çetin, C. Gañán, L. Altena, Takahiro Kasama, D. Inoue, Kazuki Tamiya, Ying Tie, K. Yoshioka, M. V. Eeten
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引用次数: 47

摘要

随着物联网僵尸网络的兴起,修复受感染设备已成为一项关键任务。由于超过87%的这些设备驻留在宽带网络中,这项任务将主要落在消费者和互联网服务提供商身上。我们首次在野外对物联网恶意软件清理进行了实证研究——更具体地说,是在一家中型ISP的网络中清除Mirai感染。为了测量修复率,我们结合了一项观察性研究和一项随机对照试验的数据,该试验涉及220名感染Mirai的消费者,以及来自蜜罐和暗池的数据。我们发现,通过围墙花园隔离并通知受感染的客户,这是ISP僵尸网络缓解传统恶意软件的最佳实践,可在14天内修复92%的感染。与不发送通知的对照组相比,仅发送电子邮件通知没有明显的影响。我们还测量了令人惊讶的高自然修复率,在这个对照组和两个参考网络中,用户也没有被通知。更令人惊讶的是,再感染率很低。在我们第一次研究后的5个月里,只有5%进行了补救的客户再次受到感染。这与我们的实验室测试形成鲜明对比,我们在几分钟内观察到真正的物联网设备再次感染——我们探索了各种不同的可能解释,但没有找到令人满意的答案。我们通过76次电话访谈和ISP的通信日志收集客户体验和行为数据。即使许多用户在错误的思维模式下操作——例如,他们在个人电脑上运行杀毒软件来解决物联网设备的感染,补救措施也会成功。虽然隔离受感染的设备显然非常有效,但未来的工作将不得不解决几个遗留的谜团。此外,由于互联网服务提供商的动机薄弱,围墙花园解决方案将很难扩大规模。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Cleaning Up the Internet of Evil Things: Real-World Evidence on ISP and Consumer Efforts to Remove Mirai
With the rise of IoT botnets, the remediation of infected devices has become a critical task. As over 87% of these devices reside in broadband networks, this task will fall primarily to consumers and the Internet Service Providers. We present the first empirical study of IoT malware cleanup in the wild -- more specifically, of removing Mirai infections in the network of a medium-sized ISP. To measure remediation rates, we combine data from an observational study and a randomized controlled trial involving 220 consumers who suffered a Mirai infection together with data from honeypots and darknets. We find that quarantining and notifying infected customers via a walled garden, a best practice from ISP botnet mitigation for conventional malware, remediates 92% of the infections within 14 days. Email-only notifications have no observable impact compared to a control group where no notifications were sent. We also measure surprisingly high natural remediation rates of 58-74% for this control group and for two reference networks where users were also not notified. Even more surprising, reinfection rates are low. Only 5% of the customers who remediated suffered another infection in the five months after our first study. This stands in contrast to our lab tests, which observed reinfection of real IoT devices within minutes -- a discrepancy for which we explore various different possible explanations, but find no satisfactory answer. We gather data on customer experiences and actions via 76 phone interviews and the communications logs of the ISP. Remediation succeeds even though many users are operating from the wrong mental model -- e.g., they run anti-virus software on their PC to solve the infection of an IoT device. While quarantining infected devices is clearly highly effective, future work will have to resolve several remaining mysteries. Furthermore, it will be hard to scale up the walled garden solution because of the weak incentives of the ISPs.
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