{"title":"是什么决定了贿赂的回归?世界各地腐败案件的证据","authors":"Yan-leung Cheung, P. Rau, Aris Stouraitis","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2020.3763","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We analyze a hand-collected sample of bribery cases from around the world to describe how the payment of bribes affects shareholder value. The net present value of a bribe conditional on getting caught is close to zero for the median firm in our sample. However, controlling for industry, country, and firm characteristics, a $1 increase in the size of the bribe is associated with an ex ante $6–$9 increase in the value of the firm, suggesting a correlation between the size of bribes and the size of available benefits. Proxies for information disclosure appear significant in explaining these benefits with more disclosure associated with lower benefits. However, this result is driven by democratic countries where bribe-paying firms receive smaller benefits relative to the bribes they pay. Information disclosure is not significant in autocratic countries. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.","PeriodicalId":48724,"journal":{"name":"Law Probability & Risk","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4000,"publicationDate":"2020-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"18","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"What Determines the Return to Bribery? Evidence From Corruption Cases Worldwide\",\"authors\":\"Yan-leung Cheung, P. Rau, Aris Stouraitis\",\"doi\":\"10.1287/mnsc.2020.3763\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We analyze a hand-collected sample of bribery cases from around the world to describe how the payment of bribes affects shareholder value. The net present value of a bribe conditional on getting caught is close to zero for the median firm in our sample. However, controlling for industry, country, and firm characteristics, a $1 increase in the size of the bribe is associated with an ex ante $6–$9 increase in the value of the firm, suggesting a correlation between the size of bribes and the size of available benefits. Proxies for information disclosure appear significant in explaining these benefits with more disclosure associated with lower benefits. However, this result is driven by democratic countries where bribe-paying firms receive smaller benefits relative to the bribes they pay. Information disclosure is not significant in autocratic countries. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.\",\"PeriodicalId\":48724,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Law Probability & Risk\",\"volume\":\"10 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-06-27\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"18\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Law Probability & Risk\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"100\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3763\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Law Probability & Risk","FirstCategoryId":"100","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3763","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
What Determines the Return to Bribery? Evidence From Corruption Cases Worldwide
We analyze a hand-collected sample of bribery cases from around the world to describe how the payment of bribes affects shareholder value. The net present value of a bribe conditional on getting caught is close to zero for the median firm in our sample. However, controlling for industry, country, and firm characteristics, a $1 increase in the size of the bribe is associated with an ex ante $6–$9 increase in the value of the firm, suggesting a correlation between the size of bribes and the size of available benefits. Proxies for information disclosure appear significant in explaining these benefits with more disclosure associated with lower benefits. However, this result is driven by democratic countries where bribe-paying firms receive smaller benefits relative to the bribes they pay. Information disclosure is not significant in autocratic countries. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.
期刊介绍:
Law, Probability & Risk is a fully refereed journal which publishes papers dealing with topics on the interface of law and probabilistic reasoning. These are interpreted broadly to include aspects relevant to the interpretation of scientific evidence, the assessment of uncertainty and the assessment of risk. The readership includes academic lawyers, mathematicians, statisticians and social scientists with interests in quantitative reasoning.
The primary objective of the journal is to cover issues in law, which have a scientific element, with an emphasis on statistical and probabilistic issues and the assessment of risk.
Examples of topics which may be covered include communications law, computers and the law, environmental law, law and medicine, regulatory law for science and technology, identification problems (such as DNA but including other materials), sampling issues (drugs, computer pornography, fraud), offender profiling, credit scoring, risk assessment, the role of statistics and probability in drafting legislation, the assessment of competing theories of evidence (possibly with a view to forming an optimal combination of them). In addition, a whole new area is emerging in the application of computers to medicine and other safety-critical areas. New legislation is required to define the responsibility of computer experts who develop software for tackling these safety-critical problems.