{"title":"具有感染力和透明性的情感主义","authors":"J. J. Joaquin","doi":"10.1080/11663081.2021.2016242","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Emotivists like Ayer claim that moral sentences are devoid of cognitive meaning since they only evince attitudinal approval or disapproval of actions. In this paper, I explore two non-classical semantic frameworks for such a view. In particular, I look into the semantics for an infectious logic and a transparent logic. Finally, I show how each of these semantic frameworks accounts for the logical behaviour of these meaningless moral sentences and their upshots to moral reasoning; in particular, how each framework addresses (an emotivist variant of) Jörgensen's dilemma.","PeriodicalId":38573,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics","volume":"14 1","pages":"1 - 10"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Infectious and transparent emotivism\",\"authors\":\"J. J. Joaquin\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/11663081.2021.2016242\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Emotivists like Ayer claim that moral sentences are devoid of cognitive meaning since they only evince attitudinal approval or disapproval of actions. In this paper, I explore two non-classical semantic frameworks for such a view. In particular, I look into the semantics for an infectious logic and a transparent logic. Finally, I show how each of these semantic frameworks accounts for the logical behaviour of these meaningless moral sentences and their upshots to moral reasoning; in particular, how each framework addresses (an emotivist variant of) Jörgensen's dilemma.\",\"PeriodicalId\":38573,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics\",\"volume\":\"14 1\",\"pages\":\"1 - 10\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-12-20\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/11663081.2021.2016242\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"Arts and Humanities\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/11663081.2021.2016242","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"Arts and Humanities","Score":null,"Total":0}
Emotivists like Ayer claim that moral sentences are devoid of cognitive meaning since they only evince attitudinal approval or disapproval of actions. In this paper, I explore two non-classical semantic frameworks for such a view. In particular, I look into the semantics for an infectious logic and a transparent logic. Finally, I show how each of these semantic frameworks accounts for the logical behaviour of these meaningless moral sentences and their upshots to moral reasoning; in particular, how each framework addresses (an emotivist variant of) Jörgensen's dilemma.