选择如何监管

IF 0.7 4区社会学 Q4 ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES

Harvard Environmental Law Review Pub Date : 2004-04-01 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.530163

Andrew P. Morriss, B. Yandle, Andy Dorchak

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引用次数: 36

摘要

在本文中，作者考察了机构如何通过传统规则制定、协商规则制定和诉讼来制定实体规则。本文运用公共选择分析方法，将代理选择与代理激励结构联系起来。本文还说明了不同形式的监管活动对机构监管内容的影响。使用EPA的重型柴油发动机的监管的一个案例研究，文章检查了EPA的选择超过30年的一种手段，测试提出的理论。最后，该条款对允许机构选择如何监管进行了批评，因为它允许机构逃避国会和总统施加的限制，从而减少了政治责任。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Choosing How to Regulate

In this Article, the authors survey how agencies create substantive regulations through traditional rulemaking, negotiated rulemaking and litigation. Using public choice analysis, the Article relates agency choice to the agency's incentive structure. The Article also shows how the different forms of regulatory activity influence the content of agency regulations. Using a case study of EPA's regulation of heavy duty diesel engines, the Article examines EPA's choices over 30 years as a means of testing the proposed theory. Finally, the Article concludes with a critique of allowing agencies to choose how they will regulate because it allows agencies to evade constraints imposed by Congress and the President and so diminishes political accountability.

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来源期刊

Harvard Environmental Law Review Multiple-

CiteScore

1.50

自引率

15.40%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Harvard Environmental Law Review is published semiannually by Harvard Law School students. Views expressed in the Review are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of HELR members. Editorial Policy: HELR has adopted a broad view of environmental affairs to include such areas as land use and property rights; air, water, and noise regula-tion; toxic substances control; radiation control; energy use; workplace pollution; science and technology control; and resource use and regulation. HELR is interested in developments on the local, state, federal, foreign, or international levels.