Control Acquisition Attack of Aerospace Systems via False Data Injection

The cyber threat to aerospace systems has been growing rapidly in recent years with several real-world and experimental cyberattacks observed. This growing threat has prompted investigation of cyberattack and defense strategies for manned and unmanned air systems, spacecraft, and other aerospace systems. The work in this paper seeks to further understand these attacks by introducing and developing a novel cyberattack for autonomous aerospace systems. The problem faced by the attacker is posed and discussed analytically using false data injection of state measurements to exploit the vehicle’s onboard controller to take control of the system. It is shown that the attacker can utilize traditional control techniques to exert control over the system and eliminate the control of the victim by intercepting and modifying the vehicle’s measurement data. The attacker is able to accomplish this objective without any prior knowledge of the system’s plant, controller, or reference signal. The attack is demonstrated on the elevator-to-pitch-attitude-angle dynamics of a Cessna T-37 aircraft model. It is shown to be successful in eliminating the victim’s control influence over the system and driving the system to its own target state.