药物还是成瘾性药物?:容忍监管的恶性循环

Nithin Mannil, Naman Nishesh, Prasanna Tantri
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引用次数: 2

摘要

在金融危机爆发之初,印度监管机构允许银行在不下调评级和提供贷款的情况下重组贷款。银行利用监管机构的宽容,通过提高利润的股息来挖掘资本。即使在危机消散后,银行仍然资本不足,迫使监管机构继续容忍。随之而来的是资本不足导致的贷款扭曲和银行业危机。统治精英们通过对有影响力地区的公司进行更多的重组、增加政府持股的股息和税收而受益。因此,监管宽容造成了一个恶性循环,外部冲击使原本健康的银行资本不足,导致其在经济复苏后继续扩大。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Medicine Or An Addictive Drug?: The Vicious Cycle Of Regulatory Forbearance
At the onset of the financial crisis, the Indian regulator allowed banks to restructure loans without downgrading and providing for them. Banks tunneled capital by increasing dividends from profits engineered using regulatory forbearance. Even after the crisis dissipated, banks remained undercapitalized, forcing the regulator to continue forbearance. Lending distortions due to undercapitalization and a banking crisis followed. The ruling elite benefited by obtaining more restructuring for firms in influential districts, increased dividends on the government's shareholding, and taxes. Thus, regulatory forbearance created a vicious cycle where exogenous shocks made otherwise healthy banks undercapitalized leading to its extension even after economic recovery.
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