{"title":"卡文迪什论生命","authors":"Laura Georgescu","doi":"10.1098/rsnr.2023.0005","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that Margaret Cavendish is a metaphysical deflationist about life. That is, it claims that, in Cavendish's mature philosophy, life is no metaphysical kind. From this it also follows that claims about matter being alive play no role in Cavendish's (natural) philosophy. On my reading, living is identical with (natural) being, Cavendish has no problem of life, and the label of vitalism is explanatorily vacuous as applied to her philosophy.","PeriodicalId":82881,"journal":{"name":"Tanzania notes and records","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Cavendish on life\",\"authors\":\"Laura Georgescu\",\"doi\":\"10.1098/rsnr.2023.0005\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper argues that Margaret Cavendish is a metaphysical deflationist about life. That is, it claims that, in Cavendish's mature philosophy, life is no metaphysical kind. From this it also follows that claims about matter being alive play no role in Cavendish's (natural) philosophy. On my reading, living is identical with (natural) being, Cavendish has no problem of life, and the label of vitalism is explanatorily vacuous as applied to her philosophy.\",\"PeriodicalId\":82881,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Tanzania notes and records\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-05-31\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Tanzania notes and records\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1098/rsnr.2023.0005\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Tanzania notes and records","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1098/rsnr.2023.0005","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper argues that Margaret Cavendish is a metaphysical deflationist about life. That is, it claims that, in Cavendish's mature philosophy, life is no metaphysical kind. From this it also follows that claims about matter being alive play no role in Cavendish's (natural) philosophy. On my reading, living is identical with (natural) being, Cavendish has no problem of life, and the label of vitalism is explanatorily vacuous as applied to her philosophy.
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