单次打法治疗理论比较

Philipp Külpmann, Christoph Kuzmics
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引用次数: 7

摘要

我们收集了具有独特和完全混合策略预测的2 × 2游戏的代表性选择的一次性游戏数据,以比较一次性游戏理论的预测能力:“竞争理论使用不同游戏和主题的预先存在数据进行校准。”我们发现,除了纳什均衡,所有理论都有预测能力;没有理论总是最好的;将风险厌恶考虑在内,可以显著提高预测能力。最后,带有风险厌恶的纳什均衡是最好的预测因素之一,除了在匹配硬币的游戏中有一个玩家的位置。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Comparing Theories of One-Shot Play Out of Treatment
We collect data of one-shot play for a representative selection of two by two games with unique and completely mixed strategy predictions, to compare the predictive power of theories of one-shot play ``out of treatment:'' competing theories are calibrated with pre-existing data using different games and subjects. We find that all theories, except Nash equilibrium, have predictive power; no theory is uniformly best; and taking into account risk aversion significantly improves predictive power. Finally, Nash equilibrium with risk aversion is among the best predictors of play, except for one player position in games of a matching pennies variety.
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