揭示新兴移动App-in-App生态系统中的资源管理风险

Haoran Lu, Luyi Xing, Yue Xiao, Yifan Zhang, Xiaojing Liao, Xiaofeng Wang, Xueqiang Wang
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引用次数: 30

摘要

app- in-app是一种新兴的移动计算模式,在这种模式下,微信、百度、TikTok和Chrome等流行的移动应用托管原生类似应用的软件模块(称为子应用),以丰富主机应用的功能,形成“一体化应用”生态系统。子应用通过主机访问系统资源,功能接近普通手机应用(拍照、录音、银行、购物等)。然而,不太清楚的是,主机应用程序(通常是第三方应用程序)是否能够安全地管理子应用程序及其对系统资源的访问。本文首次系统地研究了应用中应用系统中的资源管理。我们的研究揭示了高影响的安全漏洞,这些漏洞允许攻击者秘密地升级特权(例如,访问相机,照片库,麦克风等)或获取敏感数据(例如,位置,亚马逊的密码,b谷歌等)。为了了解这些漏洞的影响,我们开发了一个分析工具,可以自动评估Android和iOS上11个流行的应用中应用平台。我们的研究结果揭示了安全漏洞的普遍存在。我们进一步讨论吸取的经验教训,并提出缓解战略。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Demystifying Resource Management Risks in Emerging Mobile App-in-App Ecosystems
App-in-app is a new and trending mobile computing paradigm in which native app-like software modules, called sub-apps, are hosted by popular mobile apps such as Wechat, Baidu, TikTok and Chrome, to enrich the host app's functionalities and to form an "all-in-one app" ecosystem. Sub-apps access system resources through the host, and their functionalities come close to regular mobile apps (taking photos, recording voices, banking, shopping, etc.). Less clear, however, is whether the host app, typically a third-party app, is capable of securely managing sub-apps and their access to system resources. In this paper, we report the first systematic study on the resource management in app-in-app systems. Our study reveals high-impact security flaws, which allow the adversary to stealthily escalate privilege (e.g., accessing the camera, photo gallery, microphone, etc.) or acquire sensitive data (e.g., location, passwords of Amazon, Google, etc.). To understand the impacts of those flaws, we developed an analysis tool that automatically assesses 11 popular app-in-app platforms on both Android and iOS. Our results brought to light the prevalence of the security flaws. We further discuss the lessons learned and propose mitigation strategies.
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