租船失事

Fernando Arteaga, Desiree A. Desierto, Mark Koyama
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引用次数: 3

摘要

马尼拉和墨西哥之间的贸易路线被西班牙王室垄断了250多年。马尼拉大帆船是“所有海洋中最富有的船只”,但大部分财富在海上沉没,至今未被发现。我们引入了一个新构建的数据集,其中包含了所有经过这条航线的船只。我们正式展示了允许广泛收受贿赂的垄断租金如何导致超载和船舶延迟出发,从而增加海难的可能性。根据经验,我们不仅证明了这些迟到和超载的船只更有可能遭遇海难或返回港口,而且这种影响对载有更有价值、租金更高的货物的大帆船更强。这让人们对欧洲殖民帝国寻租的代价有了新的认识。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Shipwrecked by Rents
The trade route between Manila and Mexico was a monopoly of the Spanish Crown for more than 250 years. The Manila Galleons were “the richest ships in all the oceans”, but much of the wealth sank at sea and remain undiscovered. We introduce a newly constructed dataset of all of the ships that travelled this route. We show formally how monopoly rents that allowed widespread bribe-taking would have led to overloading and late ship departure, thereby increasing the probability of shipwreck. Empirically, we demonstrate not only that these late and overloaded ships were more likely to experience shipwrecks or to return to port, but that such effect is stronger for galleons carrying more valuable, higher-rent, cargo. This sheds new light on the costs of rent-seeking in European colonial empires.
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