{"title":"工资议价下周期性劳动力市场政策调整","authors":"E. Jung","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3899305","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the optimal cyclical behavior of labor market policies in an economy with asset and labor market frictions. The policies of interest include unemployment insurance (UI) and employment protection (EP). In addition to their supply-side effects, labor market policies affect the aggregate demand via earning risk and redistribution channels. Under bilateral wage bargaining, I find that procyclical UI and countercyclical EP deliver superior welfare outcomes through stabilization via both supply and demand channels.","PeriodicalId":18085,"journal":{"name":"Macroeconomics: Employment","volume":"98 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Cyclical Labor Market Policy Adjustments Under Wage Bargaining\",\"authors\":\"E. Jung\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3899305\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper analyzes the optimal cyclical behavior of labor market policies in an economy with asset and labor market frictions. The policies of interest include unemployment insurance (UI) and employment protection (EP). In addition to their supply-side effects, labor market policies affect the aggregate demand via earning risk and redistribution channels. Under bilateral wage bargaining, I find that procyclical UI and countercyclical EP deliver superior welfare outcomes through stabilization via both supply and demand channels.\",\"PeriodicalId\":18085,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Macroeconomics: Employment\",\"volume\":\"98 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Macroeconomics: Employment\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3899305\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Macroeconomics: Employment","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3899305","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Cyclical Labor Market Policy Adjustments Under Wage Bargaining
This paper analyzes the optimal cyclical behavior of labor market policies in an economy with asset and labor market frictions. The policies of interest include unemployment insurance (UI) and employment protection (EP). In addition to their supply-side effects, labor market policies affect the aggregate demand via earning risk and redistribution channels. Under bilateral wage bargaining, I find that procyclical UI and countercyclical EP deliver superior welfare outcomes through stabilization via both supply and demand channels.
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