The rhetoric of contemporary metaphor theory

From Aristotle onwards, metaphors have often been considered to be, in some sense, privileged among the rhetorical figures. Nevertheless, for about two thousand years, the essential task of rhetoric was seen to be the classification of the rhetorical figures into complex taxonomies. At the same time, metaphorical figures were often looked upon as a kind of final decoration (elocutio) given to a discourse that had already gone through several stages of planning (inventio) and organization (dispositio). But, from the start, rhetoric was also the theory (and practice) of persuasion, and this sense of rhetoric has been increasingly recognized since the middle of the twentieth century. It was doubtless no small feat of persuasion on the part of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson when, overthrowing a two thousand year old tradition, they convinced us that metaphors were not signs but a way of thinking and indeed that they form the basis of our mental concepts; and, moreover, that they were not necessarily created or thought out by special individuals such as poets and public speakers, but instead were something that accompanied us all in our everyday life. In so doing, Lakoff and Johnson opened up a new space of investigation in the study of metaphor that has been productively cultivated since then by an increasing number of scholars, the fruits of which have been plentiful. Nevertheless, it should be possible at some moment to ponder whether one or other of these changes to the notion of metaphor is really justified and whether the results of all this scholarly effort may not, in the end, pertain to something different from what traditionally was known by the term metaphor. These questions were asked during a session convened by Göran Sonesson under the auspices of the journal Cognitive Semiotics at the Third International Conference of the International Association for Cognitive Semiotics, held in Toronto, July 13–15, 2018. Participants at the time were Peer Bundgaard, Sara Lenninger, Todd Oakley, Georgios Stampoulidis, and Göran Sonesson. The present thematic issue is mostly based of the papers presented at that occasion. Oakley’s paper has been published elsewhere, but all the other articles here published are considerably reworked versions of the presentations given in Toronto. In addition, Stampoulidis has been joined by two other authors, Marianna Bolognesi and Jordan Zlatev. There is also a new contribution written by Piero Polidoro. Two of our authors can be said to work within the framework of Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT), although addressing rather serious criticism to this theory. Relying on both empirical psychological studies and theoretical arguments, Bundgaard claims that, while cross-domain mappings have a psychological reality, the same thing cannot be said about such metaphorical structures being the basis of concepts. As an alternative, Bundgaard proposes a theory of concepts based on vague predicates (where he happens to encounter Lenninger, as we will see below). Taking his point of departure in the very notion of metaphors as cross-domain mappings, Polidoro expands on Johnson’s analysis of balance, suggesting that the so-called plastic level of pictures can be understood in terms of such mappings. This supposes the somewhat ambiguous pronouncements by Lakoff and Johnson concerning the innate or acquired status of cross-domain mappings to be taken in the behavioural sense. The rest of the contributions to this issue are united by the idea that, whatever the importance of the contributions by Lakoff, Johnson, and all their followers, the use of the term “metaphor” for what is studied in CMT is seriously misleading. It is true that, in spite of the fact that the meaning associated with this term was quite different for at least two thousand years, Lakoff and Johnson have managed, in a few decades, to almost entirely eliminate this earlier tradition. This being so, these papers may be seen as engaging in a rear-guard fight. There are at least two reasons for not capitulating at the start. At least since Aristotle, metaphors have been conceived as an instrument for discovering new properties of things, that is, as being creative. But, as Sonesson argues in his paper, the so-called metaphors of CMT are the opposite of metaphors, namely part of what is taken for granted, that which form the basis of Lifeworld understanding. Indeed, this paragraph has just made use of the taken-for-granted notion according to which “ARGUMENT IS WAR” (or, more exactly, ARGUMENT IS AGGRESSION). If we now decide to rebaptize taken-for-granted notions with the term “metaphors,” real metaphors are obliterated as a task for investigation.