误解金融危机:为什么我们看不到它们的到来

Gary B. Gorton
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引用次数: 155

摘要

在2007-2008年的金融危机之前,经济学家认为美国不可能或永远不会再发生这样的危机,如此大规模的金融事件已经成为遥远的过去。事实上,观察那个遥远的过去——从内战前的半个世纪到以金融危机为标志的大萧条期间存款保险法案的通过——的人注意到,虽然危机后立即立法对其影响作出了反应,但经济学家和政策制定者始终未能抓住真正的教训。被许多人视为当代金融危机研究权威的加里•戈顿(Gary Gorton)认为,经济学家从根本上误解了金融危机——金融危机是什么,为什么会发生,以及为什么1934年至2007年间美国没有发生过金融危机。在《对金融危机的误解》一书中,他阐述了金融危机是银行债务生产所固有的,而银行债务是用来进行交易的,除非政府设计出明智的监管,否则危机将继续下去。他写道,经济学家只从某个角度出发,而忽略了所有重要的东西:资本市场和银行体系的演变,新金融工具的存在,以及某些货币市场(如出售和回购市场)的规模。在深入研究如此大规模的智力失败是如何发生的过程中,戈登对金融危机进行了回归基本的阐释,并表明它们不是由互不相关的因素巧合引起的罕见、特殊、不幸的事件。通过回顾1934年至2007年没有系统性危机的“平静时期”和2007年至2008年的“恐慌”,他将银行债务和流动性、信贷繁荣和狂热、道德风险和“大而不倒”等问题结合在一起,阐述了银行倒闭的代价和金融危机的真正原因。他认为,防止危机的成功监管未能充分跟上金融业创新的步伐,这在很大程度上是由于经济学家的误解。然后,他期待着为经济学家提供一种更好的方式来理解市场,并描述应对金融危机历史威胁所必需的监管。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Misunderstanding Financial Crises: Why We Don't See Them Coming
Prior to the financial crisis of 2007-2008, economists thought that no such crisis could or would ever happen again in the United States, that financial events of such magnitude were a thing of the distant past. In fact, observers of that distant past--the period from the half century prior to the Civil War up to the passage of deposit insurance during the Great Depression, which was marked by repeated financial crises--note that while legislation immediately after crises reacted to their effects, economists and policymakers continually failed to grasp the true lessons to be learned. Gary Gorton, considered by many to be the authority on the financial crisis of our time, holds that economists fundamentally misunderstand financial crises--what they are, why they occur, and why there were none in the U.S. between 1934 and 2007. In Misunderstanding Financial Crises, he illustrates that financial crises are inherent to the production of bank debt, which is used to conduct transactions, and that unless the government designs intelligent regulation, crises will continue. Economists, he writes, looked from a certain point of view and missed everything that was important: the evolution of capital markets and the banking system, the existence of new financial instruments, and the size of certain money markets like the sale and repurchase market. Delving into how such a massive intellectual failure could have happened, Gorton offers a back-to-basics elucidation of financial crises, and shows how they are not rare, idiosyncratic, unfortunate events caused by a coincidence of unconnected factors. By looking back to the "Quiet Period " from 1934 to 2007 when there were no systemic crises, and to the "Panic of 2007-2008, " he brings together such issues as bank debt and liquidity, credit booms and manias, and moral hazard and too-big-too-fail, to illustrate the costs of bank failure and the true causes of financial crises. He argues that the successful regulation that prevented crises did not adequately keep pace with innovation in the financial sector, due in large part to economists' misunderstandings. He then looks forward to offer both a better way for economists to conceive of markets, as well as a description of the regulation necessary to address the historical threat of financial crises.
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