Can clients of economically dependent auditors benefit from voluntary audit firm rotation? An experiment with lenders

This study utilizes a nationwide random selection of 111 lenders in a 2 × 2 between-subjects experiment to determine whether the level of an auditor's economic dependence on a client and type of auditor rotation affect lenders’ independence and reliability perceptions and decisions to lend money to a potential borrower. Previous literature shows that financial statement users use client importance as a measure of audit quality when revenue streams are not equal across clients. This can negatively affect perceptions of independence and financial statement reliability. As United States regulators look for ways to improve audit quality under the current partner rotation mandate, this study explores whether an audited entity that voluntarily adopts a policy of firm rotation can mitigate the negative effects of the auditor's dependence on the client. Findings suggest that lenders view clients of economically dependent auditors (CEDA) as less independent from its auditor and perceive its financials as less reliable than clients without a dependent auditor (non-CEDA). Lenders are less likely to grant a loan to CEDA. However, under firm rotation, there is not only an increase in lenders’ perceptions of reliability of CEDA financials, but also no difference in perceptions of reliability of CEDA and non-CEDA financials.